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The recent financial crisis demonstrated that, contrary to longstanding
regulatory assumptions, nonbank financial firms—such as investment banks
and insurance companies—can propagate systemic risk throughout the
financial system. After the crisis, policymakers in the United States and
abroad developed two different strategies for dealing with nonbank systemic
risk. The first strategy seeks to regulate individual nonbank entities that
officials designate as being potentially systemically important. The second
approach targets financial activities that could create systemic risk,
irrespective of the types of firms that engage in those transactions. In the last
several years, domestic and international policymakers have come to view
these two strategies as substitutes, largely abandoning entity-based
designations in favor of activities-based approaches. This Article argues that
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this trend is deeply misguided because entity- and activities-based
approaches are complementary tools that are each essential for effectively
regulating nonbank systemic risk. Eliminating an entity-based approach to
nonbank systemic risk—either formally or through onerous procedural
requirements—would expose the financial system to the same risks that it
experienced in 2008 as a result of distress at nonbanks like AIG, Bear
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. This conclusion is especially salient in the
United States, where jurisdictional fragmentation undermines the capacity
of financial regulators to implement an effective activities-based approach.
Significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework are necessary,
therefore, before an activities-based approach can meaningfully
complement domestic entity-based systemic risk regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a consensus has emerged among policymakers and
academics that systemic risk is not confined to the traditional banking
sector.1 Instead, contrary to longstanding assumptions, various types of
nonbank financial firms—such as investment banks and insurance
companies—can generate instability that propagates throughout the financial
system, with potentially dire consequences.2 The global financial crisis of
2008 was a vivid demonstration of such nonbank systemic risk.3
After the crisis abated, Congress resolved to strengthen regulation of
nonbank financial firms. To accomplish this, it created the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) as a centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).4 Comprised of top
financial regulators, FSOC is responsible for diagnosing and responding to
emerging forms of systemic risk whether or not those risks are confined to
the banking system.5
Congress mapped out two strategies for FSOC to achieve this objective.
The first, dubbed an entity-based approach, empowers FSOC to designate as
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“SIFIs”) individual, nonbank
financial firms that could pose systemic risk but are not appropriately
regulated with respect to this danger.6 Designated SIFIs are subject to a
supplemental layer of restrictions and oversight that augment their baseline
regulatory regime.7 This enhanced regulation of nonbank SIFIs is conducted
1. See, e.g., JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 445–48 (2016);
MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 59–62 (2d ed. 2018); KATHLEEN
C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE,
AND NEXT STEPS 25–27, 69–75 (2011); Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J.
CORP. L. 715, 718–22 (2018); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1601 (2014).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 27–34, 255
(2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC
REPORT].
4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392−94 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018)).
5. Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1113 (2015); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Dynamic Precaution” in Maintaining Financial
Stability: The Importance of FSOC, in TEN YEARS AFTER THE CRASH (Sharyn O’Halloran & Thomas
Groll, eds., forthcoming 2019); Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of
State and Federal Authority Over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1411–12 (2015); Christina
Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379, 1382 (2017).
6. Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank
Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1835–38 (2017).
7. See id.
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by the Federal Reserve—traditionally a bank regulator—and focuses on
limiting the risk that designated firms could threaten financial stability.8
Although unique in some respects, FSOC’s entity-based authority
builds on a long history of entity-based financial regulation. Indeed, many
traditional forms of financial regulation—such as solvency regulation of
insurers and banks—focus on oversight of individual legal entities.
Oftentimes, a legal entity’s charter type dictates its applicable regulatory
regime, with investment banks subject to one set of regulatory restrictions,
insurers a second set, and commercial banks a third.9 FSOC’s entity-based
approach departs from this tradition because its enhanced regulations apply
to all nonbank SIFIs, regardless of their charter types. But aside from this
design feature, FSOC’s entity-based approach fits comfortably within
traditional entity-based schemes of financial regulation.10
The second strategy that FSOC can employ to address nonbank
systemic risk is to target systemically risky financial activities, irrespective
of the firms that engage in those activities. Although this has come to be
known as FSOC’s activities-based authority, Dodd-Frank did not actually
give FSOC power to regulate financial activities directly.11 Instead, it merely
empowered FSOC to make nonbinding recommendations that individual
federal agencies implement activities-based reforms under their preexisting
authorities.12
As with its entity-based approach, FSOC’s activities-based authority is
hardly unique from the standpoint of regulatory architecture. In fact, many
types of financial regulations are organized around activities, rather than
firms. Perhaps the most well-known reform in Dodd-Frank—the creation of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)—is, in many ways,
focused on the activities of consumer credit and payment systems, rather than
the firms engaging in those activities.13 The same can be said of Dodd8. See id.
9. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory
Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 333–34 (1999); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (1998).
10. See infra Part II. The fact that the Federal Reserve’s regulatory scheme is specifically designed
to supplement, rather than displace, the ordinary entity-based rules that apply to designated firms is also
unusual. But overlapping entity-based regulatory schemes are not unique, particularly when a firm is
chartered as one type of financial institution but engages in activities that fall within the definition of
another type of financial institution.
11. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112(a)(2)(K), 124 Stat. 1376, 1395 (2010) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(K) (2018)).
12. Id.
13. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 (2008)
(proposing the creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission).
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Frank’s derivatives reforms, which generally target the activity of
derivatives trading, not the entities that conduct this trading.14 Thus, while
the procedures associated with FSOC’s activities-based authority—
particularly its nonbinding status—are unusual, the idea of organizing
financial regulation around activities, rather than firms, is not.
During the first several years after its creation in Dodd-Frank, FSOC
deployed its entity- and activities-based authorities to varying extents. FSOC
first focused on developing its entity-based authority, promulgating a
lengthy rule laying out its procedural and substantive framework for
evaluating whether a nonbank firm poses a systemic risk.15 It subsequently
designated four firms—American International Group (“AIG”), Prudential
Financial, General Electric Capital Corporation, and MetLife, Inc.—as
nonbank SIFIs.16 FSOC also used its activities-based authority during this
timeframe, albeit only once. In 2012, it recommended that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopt one of three potential reforms to its
regulatory scheme for money market mutual funds (“MMMF”).17 The SEC
responded by implementing its own version of MMMF reforms the
following year.18
More recently, however, an emerging view has begun to dominate
financial regulatory circles: that FSOC should focus principally on its
activities-based, rather than its entity-based, authority.19 This view, which
originated within think tanks and the financial industry,20 gained momentum
after President Donald Trump’s election and became the official policy of
the U.S. Treasury Department in an important 2017 Treasury Report.21
14. See Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO.
L.J. 387, 436–37 (2013).
15. Financial Stability Oversight Council Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company
Determinations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310, app. A (2019) [hereinafter FSOC Guidance].
16. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1841.
17. See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, 77 Fed. Reg.
69,455, 69,455−57 (Nov. 19, 2012).
18. See SEC Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act Release No.
9616, Investment Company Act Release No. 31166, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,737−39 (Aug. 14, 2014).
The SEC’s MMMF rules, however, were less aggressive than the approaches FSOC had proposed. See
infra note 258.
19. See infra Section II.A.
20. See, e.g., Complaint at 43–46, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp.
3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-45); Scott E. Harrington, Systemic Risk and Regulation: The Misguided
Case of Insurance SIFIs (Oct. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2998646); Peter J. Wallison, Opinion, The Trump Treasury’s Disturbing Regulatory Turn, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 6, 2017, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-trump-treasurys-disturbing-regulatory-turn1512601948.
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
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FSOC’s entity-based approach has now fallen out of favor, and the Council
has reversed the designations of all four nonbank SIFIs.22 In a bid to make
this trend lasting, the Treasury Report proposed a series of onerous
procedural barriers to future nonbank SIFI designations.23 These include a
requirement that individual designations pass traditional cost-benefit
analysis and that FSOC conduct various quantitative assessments when
considering whether a firm’s distress could threaten U.S. financial stability.24
Consistent with the Treasury Department’s recommendations, FSOC
proposed in early 2019 to prioritize an activities-based approach to nonbank
systemic risk and codify these barriers to new nonbank SIFI designations.25
This move away from an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic
risk is not localized to the United States. To the contrary, the Financial
Stability Board (“FSB”) announced that it will no longer update its list of
international insurance SIFIs—known as Global Systemically Important
Insurers (“G-SIIs”)—which it has been publishing since 2013 in a parallel
process to FSOC’s entity-based approach.26 The FSB explained that
ongoing work “to develop an Activities-Based Approach to systemic risk in
the insurance sector . . . may have significant implications for . . . the
identification of G-SIIs and for G-SII policy measures.”27 In sum, entitybased approaches to nonbank systemic risk have already been largely
displaced, and this displacement may well prove permanent if current trends
continue.28
This Article challenges the emerging consensus that FSOC and its
international counterparts should rely predominantly or exclusively on an
activities-based, rather than an entity-based, approach to nonbank systemic
DESIGNATIONS 21 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/news/Pages/Treasury-Releases-Memo
randum-to-the-President-on-FSOCs-Designation.aspx [hereinafter TREASURY FSOC REPORT].
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. See TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 22–29.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies,
84 Fed. Reg. 9028, 9028−29 (proposed March 13, 2019) [hereinafter FSOC Proposal].
26. FIN. STABILITY BD., ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK NONINSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–9 (2015), http://www.
fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2nd-Con-Doc-on-NBNI-G-SIFI-methodologies.pdf; Press Release, Fin.
Stability Bd., FSB Statement on Identification of Global Systemically Important Insurers (Nov. 21, 2017),
http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-statement-on-identification-of-global-systemically-important-insurers
[hereinafter FSB Press Release].
27. FSB Press Release, supra note 26.
28. For an international perspective on the evolution of nonbank systemic risk regulation, see
generally Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Activities Are Not Enough!: Why
Non-bank SIFI Designations Are Essential to Prevent Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GREAT CRASH 165 (Douglas W. Arner et al. eds., 2019).
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risk. Instead, it argues that entity- and activities-based approaches are both
essential, and complementary, components of an integrated strategy to
effectively regulate new and emerging forms of nonbank systemic risk.
Eliminating or substantially impeding the designation of nonbank SIFIs, the
Article contends, will ultimately expose the financial system to the same
risks that the world experienced in 2008 as a result of the financial distress
of nonbanks like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers.29
In advancing this argument, the Article first contends that even a wellimplemented activities-based regime cannot, on its own, prevent individual
nonbank firms from transmitting systemic risk.30 At bottom, this is because
an individual firm’s systemic riskiness is inherently a product of the
interrelations among its various activities and risk-management practices.
Individual activities may pose limited systemic risk in isolation, but much
greater systemic risk when combined with one another at a single firm with
lax risk-management practices and aggressive investment strategies.
This reality is illustrated by each of the major nonbanks that threatened
catastrophic failure in 2008, all of which were pushed to the brink by a broad
range of activities, rather than a single activity in isolation. AIG, for instance,
nearly failed because of the toxic interactions between its derivatives and
securities lending operations.31 Meanwhile, investment banks like Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed because they relied on numerous
different types of short-term borrowing—including commercial paper,
repurchase agreements (“repos”), and warehouse lines of credit—to back
their investments in illiquid mortgage-backed securities.32
An activities-based approach is inherently blind to this cumulative
nature of a firm’s systemic risk profile. To be sure, an activities-based
approach might be able to prevent systemic insolvencies if only a few, welldefined activities were essential ingredients for a firm to pose this type of
risk. But that is not the case. To the contrary, even assuming that a firm can
only be systemically important if it is subject to the possibility of a bank-like
“run”—an assumption we ultimately reject—the financial crisis illustrated
that there are countless ways for financial activities to create this prospect.
Not only can short-term borrowing come in innumerable forms, but various
activities that are not borrowing at all—such as transactions that potentially
require firms to post increasing amounts of cash collateral or activities that
29. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 280–91, 309–52.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in the United States, 5
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 553–54 (2015).
32. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 1, at 445–48.
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allow investors to redeem equity investments on demand—can also generate
runs on nonbank financial firms. Even more importantly, identifying ahead
of time which new financial activities may create run risk is a nearly
impossible assignment for regulators given the varied forms such risk can
take and the constant evolution of activities to evade regulatory restrictions.33
In contrast to an activities-based approach, an entity-based approach is
reasonably well designed to limit the risk that a systemically important
nonbank will fail. Perhaps most obviously, the content of entity-based
regulation—such as capital, liquidity, and risk-management requirements—
is inherently focused on the cumulative impact of a firm’s activities across
the entire financial conglomerate.34 Moreover, an entity-based approach is a
more effective deterrent against firms taking on systemic risk than an
activities-based approach, as firms can much more easily and quickly adjust
to new activities-based rules through regulatory arbitrage.35 An entity-based
approach is also inherently more reliable than the alternative, as identifying
systemically significant firms is substantially easier than identifying
systemically significant activities ex ante. Finally, an entity-based approach
that includes resolution planning requirements is necessary for the success
of Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”), which is designed
to limit the consequences of systemic insolvencies when they do occur.
Proposals to eliminate or deemphasize an entity-based approach in
favor of an activities-based approach are misguided for a second set of
reasons: an activities-based approach is much harder to implement
effectively, particularly in fragmented regulatory systems like the United
States’.36 This point is underscored by the obvious, but often overlooked or
mischaracterized, fact that FSOC does not have any legal authority to
implement activities-based reforms directly. Instead, it can only make
nonbinding recommendations that other agencies adopt such rules. As such,
proposals to deemphasize FSOC’s designation authority would end up
turning it into a glorified think tank.
Like FSOC, other domestic financial regulators have limited authority
to implement activities-based reforms. In theory, an effective activitiesbased regime would have a single regulator and would apply to all companies
that engage in a particular activity, regardless of charter type. In practice,
however, it is highly unusual for activities-based rules to apply uniformly to
33. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629,
1635 (2011).
34. See infra Section III.B.
35. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1813.
36. See infra Part IV.
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all financial firms, particularly in the United States. This fragmentation often
leads to coverage gaps and divergent outcomes, depending on the
categorization of firms engaging in specific activities.37 These gaps and
inconsistencies, in turn, promote regulatory arbitrage and undermine
regulators’ capacity to grasp the full risks created by particular
transactions.38
By contrast, FSOC’s entity-based approach faces none of these
implementation challenges. Most importantly, this is because it is layered on
top of a firm’s default regulatory regime and only applies when FSOC
determines that the baseline regime is insufficient to prevent systemic risk.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve, which administers entity-based regulation of
nonbank SIFIs, has a systemic perspective on risk due to its superior access
to information about the global financial system. No other entity-based
regulator, state or federal, has access to the same full set of information
needed to address system-wide risks.
None of this is to say that a well-designed activities-based approach
cannot help preserve financial stability. To the contrary, if configured
appropriately, activities-based regulation has the potential to combat some
sources of nonbank systemic risk even more effectively than an entity-based
approach.39 Most importantly, an activities-based approach is uniquely
capable of responding to systemic risk that may arise from correlations
across numerous different nonbank firms’ investment activities, riskmanagement practices, or product features.40 An activities-based approach
may also be better designed to address certain risks that arise from complex
relationships among firms and that require regulators or other actors to
mediate intercompany relationships though market infrastructure, such as
clearinghouses and exchanges. Finally, an activities-based approach can help
limit the type of regulatory arbitrage that accompanies all entity-based
financial regulatory regimes. When properly configured, therefore, an
activities-based approach can both level the regulatory playing field across
different market segments and prevent risks from relocating to less regulated
entities by applying consistent standards to financial transactions, regardless
of a firm’s legal classification.
As currently structured, however, the fragmented U.S. regulatory
framework is not designed to realize these potential benefits of activities37.
38.
39.
40.

See infra id.
See infra id.
See infra Section V.B.
See infra Section V.B.1; see also Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1601.
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based regulation. To operationalize an effective activities-based approach,
the United States would need to create a single financial stability regulator
with authority to oversee activities spanning different segments of the
financial sector. With such structural reforms, activities-based regulation
could meaningfully complement an effective entity-based approach. In the
absence of such reforms, however, proposals to rely primarily or exclusively
on an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk are doomed to fail.
The Article details these arguments in five Parts. Part I begins by briefly
reviewing the role of nonbank firms in the financial crisis and the continued
threats to financial stability posed by nonbank firms. In Part II, the Article
traces the evolution of entity-based and activities-based approaches to
nonbank systemic risk, showing the former has gradually been eclipsed by
the latter. Part III explains why even a well-crafted activities-based approach
must be supplemented with a robust entity-based approach to prevent
nonbanks from posing the risk of systemic insolvencies. In fact, Part IV
shows that activities-based regulation faces serious implementation
challenges, particularly in fragmented financial regulatory systems like the
United States regime. Part V then explores the significant reforms to the U.S.
regulatory framework that would be necessary to operationalize an effective
activities-based approach in the United States. Finally, Part V examines the
unique benefits that an appropriately configured activities-based approach
could offer as a complement to, rather than substitute for, entity-based
regulation. The Article therefore concludes that properly designed entityand activities-based approaches are essential and complementary elements
of an effective scheme to regulate nonbank systemic risk.
I. THE NONBANK SIFI PROBLEM
The financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that nonbank financial
companies can destabilize the financial system when not regulated
appropriately. This Part examines how nonbanks transmit systemic risk.
Section I.A begins by reviewing the central role that nonbanks played in
triggering the crisis. Section I.B then assesses the continuing financial
stability risks that nonbanks still pose a decade later. Finally, Section I.C
highlights two principal ways in which nonbanks might transmit instability
to the broader financial system: through the counterparty and asset
liquidation channels.
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A. THE ROLE OF NONBANKS IN THE CRISIS
Countless books, reports, and articles have explored the role of nonbank
financial firms in the 2008 financial crisis.41 Not surprisingly, these sources
disagree about myriad issues, ranging from the relative fault of different
types of nonbanks in causing the crisis to the transmission mechanisms by
which instability at nonbanks spread throughout the financial system. But
virtually all commentators agree on one central point: contrary to longstanding regulatory assumptions, the crisis conclusively demonstrated that
nonbank financial firms can indeed threaten the stability of the financial
system and the broader economy.
There is little doubt, for instance, that nonbank financial firms were
central in creating and propagating the mortgage-linked securities that sowed
the seeds for the 2008 crisis. Nonbank mortgage companies like Ameriquest
and New Century created the raw material for these instruments by issuing
billions of dollars of subprime loans to borrowers who had no realistic ability
to repay.42 These shaky loans were then repackaged into exotic mortgagelinked securities issued by those lenders or by nonbank securities
underwriters like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs.43 To
promote the sale of these toxic securities, insurance companies like AIG and
various financial guarantee insurers promised to protect investors in these
instruments through both credit derivatives and conventional insurance
policies.44 While many banks engaged in similar activities, nonbanks led the
charge in creating the instruments that spread risk throughout the financial
sector.
Nor is there any doubt that the failure or near failure of countless
nonbank financial firms—including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and
41.

For a sampling of scholarship on this topic, see generally BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE
FCIC REPORT, supra note 3; TIMOTHY F.
GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES (2014); ERIK F. GERDING, LAW,
BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET
(2010); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2011).
42. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 26, 40, 46, 61, 70–71.
43. See id. at 44–45; FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 134–37, 176–78. Goldman Sachs became a
bank holding company at the peak of the crisis to access the Federal Reserve’s discount window. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-18, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY IMPLEMENTED 40–
41 (2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Jon Hilsenrath et al.,
Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122202739111460721 (last updated Sept. 22, 2008, 11:59 PM).
44. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 48, 74; FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 139–42, 200–
02, 243–44.
TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH (2015);
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AIG—destabilized the broader financial system. Many of these nonbanks
relied on extremely short-term funding through repo transactions, securities
lending, or warehouse lines of credit.45 To maximize their potential return
on—and the riskiness of—the toxic mortgage-linked securities they invested
in, they employed massive amounts of leverage. When housing prices across
the country declined, these nonbank companies were the first to fail,
triggering a broader panic and necessitating massive government bailouts.46
The financial crisis, in sum, demonstrated that nonbank financial firms can
pose the very same types of systemic risk that were once thought to be
exclusive to banking.
B. THE CONTINUING RISKS POSED BY NONBANKS
The 2008 financial crisis may have been the first time that nonbank
financial firms were so clearly responsible for a market crash, but it will
almost certainly not be the last. By demonstrating that the federal
government can and will bail out nonbank financial firms whose failure
would exacerbate broader financial instability, the crisis increased nonbanks’
incentives to affirmatively become systemically significant.47 The moral
hazard created by such a guarantee against failure is obvious to the extent
that a failing firm’s management retains their jobs or company stock in the
event of a bailout.48 But it is more insidious than that: any firm that markets
believe may be bailed out by the federal government in future crises can
borrow at favorable rates.49 Such implicitly subsidized funding, in turn,
encourages firms to take on large risks that promise the possibility of
correspondingly large payoffs, while externalizing the potential costs of this
strategy onto the federal government.
This incentive for nonbanks to embrace systemic risk is stronger than
45. See Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 843, 854–55 (2016).
46. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 62; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 69–77, 79–81, 86–
95, 99–126.
47. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–38 (2011).
48. See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS 95–99
(2015).
49. Most of the empirical literature illustrating this point has focused on banks. See, e.g., João A.
C. Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy, 20 FRBNY ECON.
POL’Y REV., Dec. 2014, at 29, 33–38; Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor
Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees 35 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No.
79700, 2016). But there is evidence consistent with the conclusion that these findings would apply to
nonbank financial firms that markets expected to receive support in a crisis. See Paolo Zanghieri, The
Value and Price of a “Too-Big-to-Fail” Guarantee: Evidence from the Insurance Industry, 4 J. FIN.
PERSP.: INS. 21, 32–38 (2017).
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ever, notwithstanding public promises by government officials to end
bailouts.50 As the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis has emphasized,
such anti-bailout pledges are simply not “credible, because tying
policymakers’ hands without addressing the underlying risks from
[systemically significant] firms could inflict widespread damage on the U.S.
economy.”51 Indeed, notwithstanding claims by numerous critics that
specific nonbank bailouts were unnecessary52 or inappropriately
structured,53 virtually everyone agrees that the federal government had no
responsible choice but to prop up a broad array of bank and nonbank
financial firms in the midst of the crisis.54 Failure to do so likely would have
caused the 2008 financial crisis to exact a toll on the economy that rivaled
the Great Depression.55 In the event of a future systemic crisis, federal
decisionmakers are certain to face this very same pressure.
Not only are officials’ anti-bailout proclamations noncredible, but so
too are provisions in Dodd-Frank that ostensibly bind officials to follow
through on these proclamations. In a move designed to limit nonbank
bailouts, Dodd-Frank amended section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act,
which authorizes the Federal Reserve to lend to nondepository institutions in
“unusual and exigent circumstances . . . .”56 As revised, Federal Reserve
officials can only invoke section 13(3) to implement programs or facilities
with “broad-based eligibility”—meaning that at least five firms must be
eligible to participate. They are also prohibited from using this mechanism
to assist “a single and specific company” in avoiding insolvency
proceedings.57 But Federal Reserve officials determined to rescue a nonbank
financial firm could evade these restrictions by designing a broad-based
program or facility that included the desired recipients of bailout funds.
If this use of section 13(3) authority proved too difficult or controversial
to implement, the Federal Reserve could instead open the discount window
50. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017).
51. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL 40
(2017).
52. See, e.g., DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION 3–18 (2013); Leslie Scism, Hank
Greenberg Challenges AIG Bailout, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2014, 5:52 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/hank-greenberg-challenges-aig-bailout-1411941174.
53. See, e.g., NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF HOW WASHINGTON
ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 178–91 (2012); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES
KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 169
(Vintage Books 2011).
54. See Levitin, supra note 47, at 438–39.
55. See, e.g., GEITHNER, supra note 41, at 493–96.
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2018).
57. See id. § 343(3)(B)(iii).
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to a teetering nonbank by facilitating that firm’s conversion to a bank holding
company (“BHC”). Although rarely framed as a bailout, during the crisis the
Federal Reserve successfully encouraged nonbanks like Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley to convert to BHCs.58 Doing so allowed these firms to
borrow from the discount window against their illiquid collateral. Crucially,
Dodd-Frank did nothing to limit the Federal Reserve’s authority to deliver
bailouts to nonbanks in this way. And while Dodd-Frank did establish the
Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) as a potential alternative to bailouts,
many are skeptical about how reliable this mechanism will prove. 59 As we
discuss later, this concern is amplified with respect to nonbanks that are not
designated as systemically significant prior to the onset of a financial crisis.60
One way or another, then, bailouts of nonbank financial firms can and will
take place in future crises.61
C. SYSTEMIC RISK TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
Despite the continued threats posed by nonbank financial companies,
no consensus exists about how to identify specific nonbanks that could prove
systemically risky amidst a financial crisis. A firm’s size is both relevant and
nondeterminative in this inquiry. So too are a number of additional factors,
such as a firm’s connections with the broader financial system and its
susceptibility to run-like dynamics.62 Many observers disagree, however,
about how to evaluate these indicia of systemic risk.63 Moreover, as we
discuss below, systemic risk forecasting is an inherently uncertain exercise.64
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, we can draw important conclusions
58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 40−41; Hilsenrath, supra note 43.
59. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and Unable to Fail, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 1205, 1223–43 (2017); see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank
Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2014) (raising
constitutional objections to OLA).
60. See infra Section III.B.3.
61. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An ErsatzAntitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1375 (2011) (“Bailouts of large,
systemically important financial institutions are inevitable . . . .”).
62. Dodd-Frank, for example, contains a list of relevant factors that FSOC must consider when
identifying nonbanks that are systemically important. These factors include a firm’s size, leverage, offbalance sheet exposures, counterparty exposures, activities, and reliance on short-term funding. See 12
U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2).
63. Notably, finance academics have developed numerous different market-based predictors of a
firm’s systemic importance. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Measuring Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2, 6–14 (2017); Monica Billio et al., Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk
in the Finance and Insurance Sectors, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 538–41 (2012); Zachary Feinstein et al.,
Measures of Systemic Risk, 8 SIAM J. FIN. MATH. 672, 675–92 (2017).
64. See infra Section II.B.
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about the pathways through which financial institutions might transmit
systemic risk based on previous crises. History suggests two primary
systemic risk transmission channels: the counterparty channel and the asset
liquidation channel.65 While it is impossible to predict how systemic risk
will spread in the next financial crisis, the frequency with which the
counterparty and asset liquidation channels have propagated risks in the past
suggests that they will remain common pathways for systemic risks in the
future.
1. The Counterparty Channel
Systemic risk spreads through the counterparty channel when a firm
defaults on its financial obligations to counterparties and saddles them with
losses. Firms default on their obligations in many different circumstances,
few of which threaten financial stability. However, a nonbank financial firm
can generate systemic risk if it experiences a run in the midst of broader
financial market instability.
To be vulnerable to a run, a firm normally must fund itself with some
form of short-term liabilities payable in cash.66 Examples include repo
transactions, securities lending, and commercial paper. In many ways, these
short-term debts resemble bank demand deposits, the classic liability
implicated in runs.67 Other types of short-term liabilities, such as a firm’s
escalating need to post cash collateral, can also trigger a run.68
In the normal scenario, a firm is subject to a run if it pairs such shortterm liabilities with long-term illiquid assets.69 Firms in this position may be
required to dump their illiquid assets at fire-sale prices in order to raise
enough cash to meet immediate demands by creditors. Knowing this,
creditors will rush to claim repayment before the firm’s cash reserves run
out, in a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma. Creditors’ uncertainty about
65. FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.a.
66. In 2008, a variety of short-term obligations triggered runs at nonbanks, including repo
financing and prime brokerage accounts at leading U.S. investment banks, securities lending by AIG’s
insurance subsidiaries, and money market mutual fund shares redeemable at par. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 1, at 88–89, 103–05; Lawrence Schmidt et al., Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds, 106 AM. ECON.
REV. 2625, 2625–29 (2016); Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1571 n.1, 1585–86.
67. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401–02 (1983).
68. See infra Section IV.A.
69. In the traditional theory of financial intermediation, institutions transform short-term, private
liabilities into long-term loans. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI & KERMIT SCHOENHOLTZ, MONEY,
BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 39 (3d ed. 2010). For an alternative theory, see Robert C. Hockett
& Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1144–49 (2017) (comparing
the modern financial system to a franchise arrangement).
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the firm’s true financial health will exacerbate this stampede. Unless the
firm’s asset sales generate enough cash to cover its obligations (which is
unlikely) and absent a bailout, the firm will default.
Runs at nonbanks are likely to propagate systemic risk through the
counterparty channel if two conditions are met. First, the nonbank firm must
have large positions with counterparties that are themselves potentially
important players in the financial system. Only in such cases will the losses
inflicted on counterparties due to the nonbank’s default be large enough to
jeopardize their solvency, potentially setting off a chain reaction.
Second, for systemic risk to spread through the counterparty channel,
the broader financial system must already be in a weakened state when the
nonbank firm experiences a run. This makes the company’s impending
failure systemic, not idiosyncratic, in nature. Nonbank financial companies
fail for all sorts of reasons, few of which end up threatening financial
stability. The idiosyncratic failure of even a large and highly interconnected
nonbank financial firm generally will not threaten to bring down its
counterparties. But when the firm’s counterparties and the broader financial
system are already so financially precarious that they lack the resilience or
capital to absorb losses, the firm’s collapse could jeopardize financial
stability.70
2. The Asset Liquidation Channel
The second major conduit for systemic risk is the asset liquidation
channel. In this channel, a nonbank firm—or a group of similarly situated
nonbank firms—liquidates enough assets in a single asset class to send prices
into freefall. If the price drop is steep enough, other firms holding the same
asset could sustain losses and face insolvency.
A firm can transmit systemic risk through the asset liquidation channel
if two conditions are met. First, a significant subset of financial firms must
have correlated asset holdings. Only then can a group of nonbanks with
similar investments generate instability, harming other investors in that asset
class, by dumping those assets simultaneously. Second, the ensuing losses
must wipe out the capital of a critical mass of firms, causing insolvencies.
For this to happen, the financial system generally must be in a weakened
state.
When these two conditions are met, several different scenarios can
70. See Brief of Professors Viral V. Acharya et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20–
21, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 1:15-cv-00045-RMC, 2018 WL 1052618 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 23, 2018) (No. 16-5086) [hereinafter Acharya Br.].
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trigger asset liquidations that could generate systemic risk. The first is a run,
which can figure just as prominently in the asset liquidation channel as in the
counterparty channel. When a company attempts to staunch a run by selling
off assets to pay creditors, the downward pressure on asset prices impairs
other firms with similar holdings.71 In other cases, one or more firms could
transmit risk through the asset liquidation channel without themselves
experiencing financial distress. This could occur due to herd investing
behavior, where firms crowd into popular asset classes and sell, en masse,
less popular assets.72 Alternatively, firms responding to regulatory or rating
agency pressures to divest certain holdings could trigger the asset liquidation
channel.73 In another scenario, a firm might intentionally manipulate the
price of an asset. Thus, a nonbank firm or group of firms with the power to
move prices by dumping financial assets could be systemically significant
even if they are not particularly vulnerable to financial distress during a
broader financial downturn.
To summarize, not every nonbank financial firm poses systemic risk.
Rather, a nonbank financial firm’s systemic significance is likely to hinge on
its propensity to transmit instability through the counterparty or asset
liquidation channels.74 This propensity, in turn, will depend on the unique
characteristics of the company’s balance sheet structure, its connections to
other financial institutions, and its ability to affect the prices of financial
assets.
II. TRACING FSOC’S MOVE FROM AN ENTITY-BASED TO AN
ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH TO NONBANK SYSTEMIC RISK
This Part examines post-crisis reforms to mitigate nonbank systemic
risk in the United States and abroad. Section II.A introduces FSOC and its
dual entity- and activity-based authorities for responding to nonbank
systemic risk. It details how both FSOC and its international counterparts
have recently deemphasized an entity-based approach in favor of an
71. See Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation,
5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224, 225 (2009).
72. See GERDING, supra note 41, at 311–36.
73. See id.
74. FSOC has posited a third potential transmission channel where a firm is no longer able or
willing to provide a critical function or service that market actors rely on and for which there are no ready
substitutes. See FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.a. This critical function or service
channel will most commonly arise when the firm in question is a dominant financial intermediary—for
example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—or financial market utility, such as a payments clearing operator.
Partly for this reason, FSOC has designated a number of financial market utilities as systemically
important. See Financial Market Utility Designations, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#FMU (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
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activities-based approach. Section II.B then describes efforts in the United
States to permanently undermine FSOC’s entity-based approach by
establishing nearly insurmountable procedural requirements for future
designations of nonbank SIFIs.
A. EVOLUTION OF FSOC’S ENTITY- AND ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACHES
After the crisis, lawmakers quickly moved to address financial stability
risks arising from nonbanks. The centerpiece of their efforts was the creation
of FSOC in the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act empowered FSOC to designate
nonbank financial entities as systemically significant, an authority that has
come to be known as the “entity-based” approach. This authority, of course,
mirrors traditional financial regulation, which attaches different regulatory
regimes to different types of financial firms.75 Dodd-Frank also authorized
FSOC to make nonbinding recommendations to primary financial regulators
regarding the treatment of nonbank financial activities that raise systemic
risk concerns. This is FSOC’s so-called “activities-based” authority.
FSOC has varied over time in how it has exercised its entity- and
activities-based authorities. Initially, FSOC focused on its entity-based
authority, but more recently it has backed off from that approach. This
troubling evolution away from entity-based nonbank regulation has occurred
not only domestically but also among international financial regulators and
organizations.
FSOC’s entity-based authority allows it to designate nonbank
companies as SIFIs.76 Under section 113 of Dodd-Frank, FSOC may
designate a nonbank financial company if the firm “could pose a threat to the
financial stability of the United States” in one of two ways: (1) in the event
of its “material financial distress” (the “First Determination Standard”) or
(2) based on “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of [its] activities” (the “Second Determination
Standard”).77 Thus, the First Determination Standard allows FSOC to
designate a firm whose failure could create systemic risk. By contrast, the
Second Determination Standard permits the designation of a firm whose
operations could transmit financial stability risks, even if the company itself
75. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 364–66.
76. Dodd-Frank does not itself use the term “SIFI,” but the term is commonly used to refer to
entities designated under Section 113 of Dodd-Frank.
77. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018). A two-thirds majority of FSOC’s voting members is required
to designate a firm under either determination standard. Id. For an administrative law analysis of FSOC’s
section 113 designation power, see Robert F. Weber, The FSOC’s Designation Program as a Case Study
of the New Administrative Law of Financial Supervision, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 370–94 (2019).
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does not fail. Although the Second Determination Standard focuses on an
individual firm’s mix of “activities,” it is part of Dodd-Frank’s entity-based,
rather than activities-based, approach because it specifies one avenue for
designating an individual firm as a SIFI.
Any firm that FSOC designates as a nonbank SIFI becomes subject to
consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve.78 Critically,
the Federal Reserve’s oversight of nonbank SIFIs targets financial stability
risks. This macroprudential orientation is important because traditional
nonbank regulation, such as state-based insurance regulation and SEC
oversight of broker-dealers, is not designed to address risks to financial
stability.79 Instead, nonbank financial oversight generally focuses on other
goals, such as solvency and market conduct.80 The Federal Reserve, by
contrast, applies risk-based capital requirements, liquidity requirements,
stress tests, overall risk management standards, and other macroprudential
tools to prevent nonbank SIFIs from transmitting systemic risk through the
broader economy.81
In the years immediately following the crisis, FSOC wielded its entitybased designation power aggressively. In one of its first major actions, the
Council established a process for evaluating whether a company could pose
a threat to U.S. financial stability under either determination standard.82
After finalizing its designation procedures, FSOC quickly began evaluating
nonbank financial companies. In 2013, it designated insurance-focused
companies AIG and Prudential, as well as General Electric’s captive finance
subsidiary, GE Capital.83 The following year, FSOC added MetLife, Inc.,
78. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A).
79. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 1, at 725; Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1627–34. Broadly
speaking, macroprudential regulation addresses the stability of the financial system as a whole, while
microprudential regulation focuses on the stability of individual financial institutions. See Jacek Osiński
et al., Int’l Monetary Fund, Macroprudential and Microprudential Policies: Toward Cohabitation, 4,
SDN 2013/05 (June 2013).
80. See infra Section III.B.4.
81. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a).
82. See FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.
83. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (2013), https
://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination
%20Regarding%20American%20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter AIG DESIGNATION];
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S
FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, INC. (2013), https://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination%2
0Regarding%20General%20Electric%20Capital%20Corporation,%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter GE CAPITAL
DESIGNATION]; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (2013), https://www.
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another insurance-focused firm.84 FSOC concluded that material financial
distress at each of these firms could threaten U.S. financial stability under
the First Determination Standard, but it did not evaluate any of these firms
under the Second Determination Standard.85 FSOC closely analyzed five
additional firms but ultimately opted not to designate them.86
International financial regulators adopted a similar entity-based
orientation to nonbank systemic risk in the years after the crisis. The
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”), for example,
developed a methodology for identifying global systemically important
insurers (“G-SIIs”) at the urging of the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”).87
Beginning in 2013, the IAIS published annual lists of such firms, identifying
nine G-SIIs, including AIG, MetLife, and Prudential.88 The IAIS and FSB
instructed the G-SIIs’ home country regulators to subject these firms to
enhanced macroprudential oversight.89
In contrast to its early entity-based designations, the Obama
Administration FSOC rarely used its authority to recommend that primary
financial regulators implement activities-based reforms. Under section 120
of Dodd-Frank, FSOC may “issu[e] recommendations to the primary
financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened standards and
safeguards” to any activity that could increase risks in the financial sector.90
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter
PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION].
84. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf [hereinafter METLIFE
DESIGNATION].
85. See AIG DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4; GE CAPITAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4;
PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 5; METLIFE DESIGNATION, supra note 84, at 4.
86. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 120 (2017), https://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC_2017_Annual_Report.pdf [hereinafter
FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT].
87. See generally INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
INSURERS (2013), https://www.fsb.org/2016/06/global-systemically-important-insurers-updated-assess
ment-methodology. Paralleling FSOC’s First Determination Standard, the IAIS and FSB defined G-SIIs
as insurers whose “distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial
system . . . .” See id. at 3 n.1.
88. See Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs), FIN. STABILITY BOARD,
http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/systematically-important-financial-institutionssifis/global-systemically-important-financial-institutions-g-sifis (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
89. See FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2010), https://www.fsb.org/2010/11/r_101111a.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 5330(a) (2018). FSOC may identify an activity for heightened regulation if it
determines that “the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, or interconnectedness of such
activity or practice could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems” in
the financial sector. Id.
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Critically, however, the primary financial regulators are not obligated to
adopt FSOC’s activities-based recommendations.91 Nor does FSOC have
authority to write rules governing financial activities on its own. FSOC’s
activities-based powers, therefore, are no more potent than recommendations
by an advisory council.
The Obama-era FSOC used its section 120 activities-based authority
only once. In 2012, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner asked FSOC to
recommend regulations for MMMFs after the SEC declined to adopt longanticipated rules for these funds.92 Exercising its section 120 power, FSOC
requested public comment on regulatory approaches to mitigate systemic
risk posed by MMMFs.93 The SEC responded to FSOC’s recommendations
by adopting its own MMMF reforms the following year.94
FSOC considered—but declined to pursue—other activities-based
recommendations during the Obama Administration. In late 2014, for
example, FSOC sought public comment on whether the products and
activities of asset managers, including hedge funds, could pose a risk to
financial stability.95 In response to public input, FSOC created an
interagency working group to monitor the use of leverage by hedge funds
and analyze the sufficiency of hedge funds’ data reporting.96 FSOC,
however, stopped short of recommending enhanced regulations of any asset
managers’ activities.97
Opponents of FSOC’s entity-based designations seized on the
Council’s sparing use of its section 120 authority and urged it to use an
activities-based approach in lieu of designating nonbank SIFIs. Activities91. 12 U.S.C. § 5330(c)(2).
92. See Kirsten Grind, Funds Face New Battle on Rules, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10000872396390443493304578038410540850592 (last updated Oct. 5, 2012, 6:54 PM).
MMMFs are specialized pooled investment vehicles that typically invest in low-risk assets such as
commercial paper and government securities. See Hester Peirce & Robert Greene, Opening the Gate to
Money Market Fund Reform, 34 PACE L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2014).
93. See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, 77 Fed. Reg.
69,455, 69,455 (Nov. 19, 2012).
94. For the SEC release adopting these reforms, see generally Money Market Fund Reform;
Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act Release No. 9616, Investment Company Act Release No. 31166,
79 Fed. Reg. 47,736 (Aug. 14, 2014). The SEC’s MMMF rules, however, were less stringent than the
approaches FSOC had proposed. See Allen, supra note 5, at 1119.
95. See Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg.
77,488, 77,488−89 (Dec. 24, 2014).
96. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, UPDATE ON REVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT
PRODUCTS AND ACTIVITIES 20–21 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/
FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activi
ties.pdf.
97. See id.
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based regulation, these critics insisted, would more effectively mitigate
nonbank risks by providing clear guidance about how a broad range of
financial firms could mitigate their systemic significance.98 By contrast,
opponents contended that the entity-based approach was fundamentally
flawed. For example, critics argued that it created an uneven playing field
for designated firms, who would be unable to compete with firms not subject
to enhanced regulation.99 Moreover, critics feared that the Federal Reserve—
traditionally a bank regulator—would subject SIFIs to bank-centric
regulations, which they insisted would be inappropriate for a nonbank
business model.100 Finally, opponents alleged that FSOC’s designation
process was opaque, arbitrary, political, and driven by the FSB, effectively
outsourcing domestic regulatory decisions to international policymakers.101
Criticism of FSOC’s entity-based designation authority was particularly
pronounced in the financial sector and among conservative political
commentators. Prior to MetLife’s designation, for example, the firm’s CEO
implored FSOC to “adopt an activities-based approach to systemic risk,
rather than an institutions-based approach.”102 Sometimes, conservative
critics confused FSOC’s section 120 activities-based authority with its power
to designate a nonbank SIFI based on its activities under section 113’s
Second Determination Standard.103 This confusion, in turn, created a
misimpression that FSOC had direct statutory authority to implement an
activities-based approach.104 Other critics argued that the best way to limit
nonbank systemic risk is through an activities-based approach, and FSOC
and international regulators should therefore abandon their efforts to
98. See, e.g., The Arbitrary and Inconsistent Non-Bank SIFI Designation Process: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 5 (2017)
[hereinafter Holtz-Eakin Statement] (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action
Forum).
99. See, e.g., Dirk A. Kempthorne, Designating Life Insurers as SIFIs Creates Uneven Playing
Field, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Aug. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
opinion/designating-life-insurers-as-sifis-creates-uneven-playing-field.
100. See Steven A. Kandarian, Chairman, President and CEO, MetLife, Inc., Keynote Address at
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Capital Markets Summit: Life Insurers as SIFIs: A Case of Mistaken
Identity? 1−2 (Apr. 10, 2013) (on file with authors). For a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s role as a
bank regulator, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
158–75 (Princeton Univ. Press 2018).
101. See The Arbitrary and Inconsistent Non-Bank SIFI Designation Process: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 48 (2017)
(statement of Alex J. Pollock, Distinguished Senior Fellow, R Street Institute).
102. See Kandarian, supra note 100.
103. See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 20 (mischaracterizing the Trump Administration’s proposed
shift to section 113 activities-based regulation as an exercise of its section 120 entity-based authority
using the Second Determination Standard).
104. See id.
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designate individual firms as systemically significant.105 Critics, in sum,
portrayed an activities-based approach as an alternative, rather than a
complement, to the entity-based approach.
Over time, these criticisms have evolved into a seeming consensus
among policymakers that FSOC should focus on an activities-based
approach in lieu of entity-based designations. With President Trump’s
financial regulatory nominees serving as voting members of FSOC, a
majority of the Council now holds this view. In fact, FSOC has shifted its
focus to activities-based regulation in two different ways.
First, FSOC reversed all of its entity-based designations, freeing each
of the previously-designated nonbank SIFIs from Federal Reserve oversight.
Even before President Trump’s election, FSOC voted unanimously to
rescind GE Capital’s designation after the company shrunk by more than half
and substantially simplified its activities in an effort to reduce its systemic
footprint.106 More controversially, after many of President Trump’s
nominees took office, FSOC voted 6–3 to rescind AIG’s designation.107
Later, FSOC freed MetLife from enhanced regulation by dropping its appeal
of a district court order overturning the company’s designation on procedural
grounds.108 Finally, the Council rescinded Prudential’s SIFI designation in
late 2018, leaving no remaining nonbank SIFIs.109
Second, FSOC is in the process of adopting formal policies prioritizing
105.
106.

See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin Statement, supra note 98, at 6−7.
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING GE CAPITAL GLOBAL HOLDINGS, LLC 2
(2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/GE%20Capital%20Public%2
0Rescission%20Basis.pdf.
107. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 12 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designatio
ns/Documents/American_International_Group,_Inc._(Rescission).pdf; cf. Gregg Gelzinis, Deregulating
AIG Was a Mistake, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprog
ress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/10/11/440570/deregulating-aig-mistake (arguing that AIG did not
sufficiently simplify itself to warrant de-designation).
108. See Alistair Gray, Trump Administration Drops Appeal in MetLife ‘Too Big to Fail’ Case, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/cfc31764-ff65-351d-95f2-78e7b413af4f.
109. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 2 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Prudential-FinancialInc-Rescission.pdf. Jeremy Kress has argued that Prudential’s de-designation was arbitrary and
capricious because the Council violated its procedural rules, relied on misleading quantitative analyses,
and ignored a mandatory statutory factor. See Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal
Deregulation of Prudential Financial, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 175−82 (2018). For further analysis
of FSOC’s de-designation of nonbank SIFIs, see David Zaring, The Federal Deregulation of Insurance,
97 TEX. L. REV. 125, 135−54 (2018).
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its section 120 activities-based authority over its section 113 designation
power. In early 2017, President Trump directed FSOC to discontinue new
nonbank SIFI designations while the Treasury Department conducted a
thorough review of FSOC’s designation process.110 Several months later, the
Treasury Department issued recommendations that would fundamentally
change FSOC’s approach to nonbank systemic risk.111 Calling entity-based
designations “a blunt instrument” for addressing systemic risk, the Treasury
Department urged FSOC to prioritize an activities-based approach and to
resort to entity-based designations in exceedingly rare circumstances.112
FSOC proposed formal guidance adopting substantially all of the Treasury
Department’s recommendations in March 2019 (“the FSOC Proposal”).113
FSOC, however, has not issued any new activities-based recommendations
in the interim.
Mirroring these domestic developments, international policymakers
have also deemphasized entity-based approaches to nonbank regulation.114
Just one week after the Treasury Department’s report, the FSB announced
that it would not publish a new list of G-SIIs for 2017 in light of “work being
undertaken by the IAIS to develop an Activities-Based Approach to systemic
risk in the insurance sector . . . .”115 Such an approach, the FSB cryptically
suggested, “may have significant implications for the assessment of systemic
risk in the insurance sector and hence for the identification of G-SIIs and for
G-SII policy measures.”116 A few weeks later, the IAIS issued a public
consultation document that laid out broad principles for implementing an
activities-based approach in the insurance sector.117
110. See Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight
Council (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandumsecretary-treasury.
111. For these recommendations, see generally TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21.
112. Id. at 19–21. Specifically, the Treasury Department recommended that FSOC follow a threestep process: (1) prioritize reviews of potential stability risks from financial activities and products; (2)
work with primary financial regulators to address identified risks, including through section 120
activities-based recommendations if necessary; and (3) consider individual firms for designation only if
consultation with the primary regulators is insufficient to mitigate risks to financial stability. See id.
113. See generally FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9028 (proposing the prioritization of an
activities-based approach).
114. For a full account of the international shift away from entity-based nonbank systemic risk
regulation, see generally Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 28.
115. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Statement on Identification of Global Systemically
Important Insurers (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-statement-on-identification-ofglobal-systemically-important-insurers.
116. Id.
117. See generally INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH TO SYSTEMIC
RISK (2017), https://www.iaisweb.org/page/consultations/closed-consultations/2018/activities-based-ap
proach-to-systemic-risk//file/70440/interim-aba-cp-final-for-launch.
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In sum, policymakers have completely transformed their approach to
nonbank systemic risk in the years since the crisis. FSOC initially deployed
its entity-based authority with marked success, resulting in firms like GE
Capital and, to a lesser extent, AIG reducing their systemic footprints to
escape SIFI designation. Yet entity-based designations have fallen out of
favor, and policymakers have coalesced around a new consensus that
systemic risk regulation should focus on an activities-based approach. New
entity-based designations have ceased and policymakers have proposed
policies that could eliminate or substantially deemphasize designations in the
future.
B. NEW PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO FSOC’S ENTITY-BASED AUTHORITY
Proponents of the shift to activities-based nonbank systemic risk
regulation hope to permanently erect procedural barriers to nonbank SIFI
designations. Most recently, the Trump Administration proposed that FSOC
(1) conduct various quantitative assessments when considering whether a
firm’s material financial distress could threaten U.S. financial stability, and
(2) perform a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of each designation.118 If
enacted, these new policies would slow FSOC’s evaluation of nonbank
financial companies, increase the litigation risk associated with new
designations, and significantly undermine the feasibility of an entity-based
approach.119
1. New Procedural Requirements for Designation
The First Determination Standard under section 113 of Dodd-Frank—
which authorizes designation if FSOC “determines that material financial
distress at” a nonbank “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the
United States”120—has formed the basis for all four nonbank SIFI
designations to date.121 The Trump Administration, however, has proposed
attaching two prerequisites to determinations under this standard: a threshold
vulnerability analysis and a series of quantitative assessments. Both
prerequisites depart from the mandates of Dodd-Frank and would
118. See FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9041−46; TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at
26–28.
119. For additional analysis of the Trump Administration’s proposal to impede nonbank SIFI
designations, see generally Financial Stability Oversight Council Nonbank Designations: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Professor Jeremy
C. Kress).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
121. See AIG DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4; GE CAPITAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4;
METLIFE DESIGNATION, supra note 84, at 4; PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 5.
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substantially undermine the practical ability of FSOC to designate nonbank
SIFIs in the future.
The first new procedural requirement proposed by the Trump
Administration is that FSOC assess a firm’s likelihood of financial distress
as a “threshold question” in the nonbank SIFI designation process.122 The
Trump Administration contends that “[s]ound risk regulation requires
consideration of not only the impact of an identifiable risk, but also the
likelihood that the risk will be realized.”123 Reading between the lines, the
Trump Administration is signaling that FSOC should refrain from
designating a firm unless the company is likely to experience material
financial distress.124
However, such a threshold “vulnerability” analysis conflicts with
Dodd-Frank’s text. Dodd-Frank does not instruct FSOC to evaluate the
likelihood that a nonbank financial firm will experience material financial
distress. To the contrary, Congress directed FSOC to assume that the firm is
in distress and analyze whether that distress “could pose a threat” to U.S.
financial stability.125
The Trump Administration’s proposed vulnerability analysis would
undermine FSOC’s ability to prevent a systemically significant failure
through designation. Congress had good reason for instructing FSOC to
conduct its designation analysis by assuming financial distress at a company.
It wanted FSOC to take a precautionary approach by considering designation
where a nonbank financial firm could—not would—threaten U.S. financial
stability.126 This safeguard is eminently sensible, because the FSOC
designation process is inherently lengthy and results in regulation and
supervision of designated firms by an entirely separate entity: the Federal
Reserve. Consequently, there will inevitably be a substantial time gap
between a firm’s initial designation and the implementation of enhanced
regulation and supervision for that firm. A system that reacts to systemically
risky firms only years after they become vulnerable to failure is certain to be
ineffective.127
122. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 26; see also FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at
9044−45 (proposing that the Council assess a potential designee’s likelihood of material financial
distress).
123. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 26.
124. See id. at 27; see also FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9044−45.
125. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1).
126. Yet another concern is that requiring FSOC to estimate a firm’s chance of distress could
perversely increase the risk of a run by signaling questions about a designated company’s solvency.
127. Indeed, a central principle of effective financial regulation is that regulators must intervene
quickly when a firm is in trouble, as firms approaching insolvency have strong incentives to gamble for
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The second way that the Trump Administration recommended adding
hurdles to Dodd-Frank’s designation process was by suggesting that, as part
of any future designation, FSOC should be required to conduct a series of
quantitative assessments. This includes not only the threshold vulnerability
analysis described above, but also various statistical analyses designed to
illustrate how a firm’s distress would reverberate throughout the U.S.
financial system. For instance, the Trump Administration suggested that
FSOC should be required to “quantify the losses that each of [a firm’s]
counterparties would suffer in the event of its distress,” including any factors
that would reduce losses to the counterparties.128 And it suggested requiring
quantitative evaluations of “the means by which a company’s asset fire sale
could disrupt trading or funding markets or cause significant losses or
funding problems for other companies with similar holdings.”129
The Trump Administration embraced these reforms after MetLife
successfully challenged its SIFI designation in court based on FSOC’s
refusal to perform similar analyses. In MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability
Oversight Council,130 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
found FSOC’s designation of MetLife arbitrary and capricious because
FSOC failed to consider the statistical probability of MetLife experiencing
material financial distress or the magnitude of the ensuing losses to
MetLife’s counterparties.131 The court required FSOC to statistically
estimate these ensuing losses “based on reasoned predictions,” stating that
“a summary of exposures and assets is not a prediction.”132 Effectively, the
court insisted that FSOC use multivariate regression analysis, not descriptive
statistics, to analyze how a firm’s distress could impact the broader financial
system.133
As a district court opinion, the MetLife ruling holds limited precedential
value and does not necessarily bind FSOC in the future.134 But by proposing
that FSOC formally adopt the court’s analysis through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, the Trump Administration would elevate it to a binding feature
resurrection. See George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for
Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 375 (1994).
128. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 24.
129. Id. at 11.
130. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016).
131. Id. at 233–39.
132. Id. at 237.
133. FSOC initially appealed the district court’s decision but later dropped its appeal after President
Trump took office. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 16-5086, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS
162, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2018).
134. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (discussing the precedential weight
of a federal district court decision).
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of future FSOC designations.135
Mandatory quantitative projections of the type envisioned by the
MetLife decision and proposed by the Trump Administration would
effectively require the impossible as a condition of future designations.
Simply put, officials cannot reliably predict the probability that any one
nonbank will experience material financial distress that will have systemic
consequences for the broader financial system. This is because much of
systemic risk oversight operates on the frontiers of what the economist Frank
H. Knight termed “the unknowable.”
Nearly a century ago, Knight distinguished predictions that are
amenable to probability analysis from those that are not. According to
Knight, two types of predictions can be analyzed probabilistically. The first,
known knowns, involves deductions about the future that follow
mathematical rules or established laws of science.136 The second, known
unknowns, involves forecasts that can be induced empirically using
statistics.137 Such statistical analyses require enough similar prior
occurrences to permit statistical inferences with a sufficient degree of
confidence. Even when this condition is met, statistical predictions entail
higher potential error than the logical mathematical rules of probability that
apply to known knowns.138 Further, while statistical forecasts can predict
how many people in a group will experience an event, they cannot identify
exactly who will experience it.139
A third category of predictions—unknowables—involves so many
factors that it is impossible to formulate probability forecasts.140 The
“conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance” in this
situation “is simply inapplicable.”141 Knight referred to this as uncertainty
and distinguished it from risk, which involves the measurable certainty that
is entailed in known unknowns.142
135. In its proposed guidance, the Council asked for public comment on whether it should “interpret
its authority under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act in a manner that is consistent with the opinion of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight
Council . . . .” FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9035.
136. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 6, 214–15, 224–25 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc.
2006) (1921). Known knowns are almost never found in the economic realm. Instead, they are normally
restricted to certain physical phenomena such as the law of gravity. Id. at 210–24.
137. Id. at 6, 215, 224–25.
138. Id. at 215, 230–31.
139. Id. at 217.
140. Id. at 218.
141. Id. at 231.
142. Id. at 19–20, 233.
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The MetLife opinion and the Trump Administration’s probability
analysis recommendations are deaf to the fact that major elements of
systemic risk lie in the realm of uncertainty rather than risk. Thus, when the
Trump Administration calls on FSOC to calculate the statistical likelihood
of a firm experiencing material financial distress that could trigger a chain
reaction, or to quantify the precise pathways of such a chain reaction, it
makes herculean demands. This is because systemic failures only occur
when the broader financial system is unstable and other financial firms are
too weak to survive losses.143 As a result, the likelihood of systemic failure
cannot be modeled without predicting the chance that crisis conditions will
already exist in the larger financial system.
It is impossible, however, to statistically estimate the likelihood,
magnitude, or timing of a future financial crisis.144 Sample size is one barrier.
Unless the sample is sufficiently large, reliable statistical inferences cannot
be drawn.145 This problem is insurmountable when it comes to nonbank
firms, which did not manifest systemic risk (with rare exceptions) before
2008 and thus are relatively new objects of systemic concern.146
Further complicating the statistical task, analysts would have to
consider far too many potential explanatory variables to draw inferences
with confidence.147 In the systemic risk context, there are a virtually infinite
number of explanatory factors that can predict a future financial crisis or
losses to a firm’s counterparties.148 Innumerable permutations of events
might make financial companies fragile. Some of those scenarios are known
from past experience, but others are unknown and cannot be anticipated,
making any forecast too conservative. Moreover, because the timing of
143. FSOC’s guidance makes clear that it assesses the impact of the company’s material financial
distress “in the context of a period of overall stress in the financial services industry and in a weak
macroeconomic environment.” FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.b.
144. See Acharya Br., supra note 70, at 12; see also DAVID ORRELL, THE FUTURE OF EVERYTHING
7–8, 112–13, 169, 243 (2007) (describing mathematically why financial systems are too complex to be
predictable); Serena Ng & Jonathan H. Wright, Facts and Challenges from the Great Recession for
Forecasting and Macroeconomic Modeling, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1140–50 (2013) (analyzing
impediments to statistical forecasts of financial crises).
145. See, e.g., DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY & GEORGE C. RUNGER, APPLIED STATISTICS AND
PROBABILITY FOR ENGINEERS 312–21 (2d ed. 1999); Ng & Wright, supra note 144, at 1144.
146. See supra Part I. One potential exception is Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. See
generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2000) (providing an extensive history of Long-Term Capital Management).
147. In statistical terms, analysts would have too few degrees of freedom to take all of the possible
disaster scenarios into account. See, e.g., What Are Degrees of Freedom in Statistics?, MINITAB BLOG
(Apr. 8, 2016), http://blog.minitab.com/blog/statistics-and-quality-data-analysis/what-are-degrees-offreedom-in-statistics.
148. See Ng & Wright, supra note 144, at 1146.
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crises is hard to predict, statisticians would have to compute their projections
for multiple and often distant points in the future.
The analysis could not stop there, because financial crises have a large
behavioral element. Next, statisticians would have to predict how other
market participants would react if the counterparties’ solvency was in doubt
and the counterparties’ responses to those reactions. The often irrational
nature of market actors’ reactions and the many assumptions that would need
to be made would relegate any such projections to guesswork. In short, there
would be far too many potential explanatory variables to make accurate
predictions under these circumstances, particularly given the small sample
size available.
Because material financial distress (in the systemic sense) cannot occur
outside of crisis conditions, any attempt to statistically model an individual
company’s systemic distress would be subject to question. Further, even if a
financial catastrophe could be forecasted, that forecast would only apply to
financial firms in the aggregate, not to specific firms. Nothing in that forecast
would tell us that MetLife, for instance, would be the one to trigger that crisis
instead of another firm. Even the Trump Administration has conceded this
point, stating that “[t]here is no proven method for predicting with precision
the effect that the failure of any nonbank financial company will have on
financial stability.”149
To summarize, the Trump Administration and the MetLife court would
require the impossible of FSOC by insisting that it statistically calculate both
the probability of any distress at a nonbank that could threaten financial
stability and the pathways by which such distress might spread. In the
process, they have brought FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank SIFIs to a
halt and opened up any future designations to the prospect of judicial
challenge.
2. A New Cost-Benefit Requirement
The Trump Administration also recommended that, prior to any future
nonbank SIFI designation, FSOC conclude that “the expected benefits to
financial stability from Federal Reserve supervision and prudential standards
justify the costs that the [designation] would impose.”150 Such a quantitative
cost-benefit analysis, however, would increase the legal risk of future SIFI
designations because it is nearly impossible to calculate the costs and
149. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 23.
150. FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9044; see also TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at
27 (recommending a quantitative cost-benefit analysis).
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benefits of designation with anything approximating precision.
Like its first recommendation, the Trump Administration’s cost-benefit
proposal finds its origins in the MetLife decision. MetLife challenged its
designation on the alternative ground that FSOC failed to consider the costs
of designating the firm.151 After enumerating the ten specific factors that
FSOC must consider when evaluating a nonbank financial company, DoddFrank adds to the list “any other risk-related factors that the Council deems
appropriate.”152 Even though this last catchall provision is couched in
permissive language, the MetLife court held that it required FSOC to
consider the costs MetLife would incur from designation.153
Although most commentators agree that the MetLife court’s costbenefit analysis is suspect as a matter of statutory interpretation,154 the
Trump Administration would nonetheless require FSOC to perform
quantitative cost-benefit analyses as a matter of policy. This standard, if
codified in FSOC’s Interpretive Guidance, “risks imposing an impossible
burden on the council . . . .”155
Similar to assessing a firm’s likelihood of systemic distress, quantifying
the costs and benefits of nonbank SIFI designations poses serious analytical
challenges. The stability-enhancing benefits of financial regulations are
particularly difficult to calculate accurately. Quantifying the benefit of a
crisis averted is nearly impossible.156 Because of the infrequency of financial
crises, moreover, financial regulatory cost-benefit analyses are highly
sensitive to crude economic loss and discount rate assumptions.157
Unpredictable financial market dynamics, including future regulation and
adaptation by financial firms, further complicate any attempt to quantify the
effects of financial regulation.158
For these reasons, quantitative cost-benefit analysis is susceptible to ex
151. See Complaint at 71–72, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219
(D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-0045).
152. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (2018).
153. See MetLife, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 239–42.
154. See, e.g., Brief of Professors of Administrative Law and Financial Regulation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 5–9, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 16-5086, 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 162 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2018); Jared Bernstein, Financial Reform and MetLife: The Judge
Got it (Mostly) Wrong, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2016/04/12/financial-reform-and-metlife-the-judge-got-it-mostly-wrong.
155. Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1822.
156. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 960–69 (2015).
157. See, e.g., id. at 947, 962, 972.
158. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43.
J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S373–75 (2014).
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post second-guessing by a reviewing court.159 Indeed, courts have
increasingly overturned agencies’ rules “on the ground that [the] court would
conduct its guesstimated [cost-benefit analysis] differently than [the] agency
would.”160 As a result, the uncertainty and discretion inherent in quantitative
cost-benefit analyses create litigation risk for financial regulators. A
nonbank SIFI might be especially motivated to challenge its designation
because Federal Reserve regulation would put it at a perceived competitive
disadvantage to competitors who operate free from those rules.
To conclude, requiring FSOC to perform quantitative cost-benefit
analyses, as the Trump Administration proposes, would hold the Council to
an impossible standard and render future SIFI designations vulnerable to
legal challenge. It would thus further eviscerate entity-based nonbank
regulation.
III. WHY AN ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH MUST BE
SUPPLEMENTED WITH AN ENTITY-BASED APPROACH
These evolving barriers to FSOC’s designation authority are deeply
misguided. Even assuming the implementation of an effective activitiesbased regime, an entity-based approach is necessary to prevent nonbank
firms from propagating systemic risk. This Part explains why. Section III.A
contends that even a well-executed activities-based approach, standing
alone, cannot reliably prevent individual firms from becoming systemically
important. Section III.B then argues that FSOC’s entity-based designation
authority is reasonably well tailored to promote this objective, while
criticisms of this authority are overblown. This Part focuses on nonbank SIFI
designations in the United States, but its arguments are largely applicable to
parallel entity-based regimes at the international level, such as the FSB’s
designation regime for G-SIIs.
A. AN ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH IS POORLY SUITED TO PREVENT
SYSTEMIC INSOLVENCIES
Proposals to replace FSOC’s entity-based approach with an activitiesbased approach assume that appropriately regulating systemically risky
activities will prevent nonbanks from experiencing a systemic insolvency.161
Although intuitively attractive, this assumption is wrong. While activitiesbased regulation may mitigate some sources of systemic risk,162 even well159.
160.
161.
162.

See Coates, supra note 156, at 920.
Id. at 919–20.
See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin Statement, supra note 98, at 37; Harrington, supra note 20.
See infra Section V.B for a discussion of how activities-based regulation could limit some
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designed activities-based rules cannot prevent nonbanks from experiencing
systemic insolvencies. At bottom, this is because the risk that a firm will
experience a systemic failure is inherently a product of the interrelations
among its various activities. Individual activities may pose limited systemic
risk in isolation, but much greater systemic risk when combined at an
individual firm. An activities-based approach is inherently blind to these
realities.
This point is well understood with respect to individual firms. Indeed,
modern risk management emphasizes the importance of understanding and
managing a firm’s risks holistically, across the entire enterprise.163 Failure
to take such an “enterprise-wide” approach to managing risk can result in
problems that cross-cut a firm’s operations remaining undiagnosed or
ignored.164 But the centrality of the relationships among a firm’s individual
activities is equally applicable to the effective management of systemic risk.
To appreciate this point, consider the two main transmission mechanisms by
which the failure of nonbank financial institutions can trigger broader
financial instability: the counterparty channel and the asset liquidation
channel.165
1. The Counterparty Channel
As discussed in Part I, a firm’s susceptibility to a run is central to the
prospect that it could trigger systemic risk through the counterparty channel.
Moreover, only certain activities could plausibly expose a nonbank to the
risk of a run, which requires some form of short-term liabilities.166 Longterm debt funding or the issuance of term life insurance products do not
create any run risk, while securities lending and the issuance of deposit-like
contracts almost certainly do.167 Thus, many calls for an activities-based
approach to nonbank systemic risk target activities that are thought to create
run risk.168
Yet an activities-based approach cannot prevent the excessive
types of systemic risk, if properly configured.
163. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
ENFORCEMENT § 4.02 & cmt. a (Council Draft No. 3, Sept. 11, 2019).
164. Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate
Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 572–77 (2008).
165. See supra Section I.C.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 117, at 11–13 (naming activities that
create liquidity risk as the first type of activity that would be subject to scrutiny under an activities-based
approach).
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accumulation of run risk at an individual nonbank financial firm for three
reasons. First, numerous types of activities are known to create run risk, and
many other activities may create run risk in ways that are not yet fully
understood. Second, even if regulators could accurately identify conduct that
creates run risk, a pure activities-based approach would still fail to prevent
the excessive accumulation of such risk, which inherently depends on the
interrelationships among a firm’s activities. Finally, an activities-based
approach is also incapable of addressing other key factors relevant to
counterparty risk, such as the size and character of a firm’s connections to
other large financial firms.
i. Numerous Known and Unknown Activities Can Create Run Risk
The financial crisis vividly demonstrated that any type of short-term
borrowing can cause a run at a nonbank financial firm.169 Just as panicked
depositors can withdraw funds from their bank account en masse, panicked
counterparties in these transactions can collectively refuse to roll over their
loans to the vulnerable nonbank. This dynamic repeated itself in numerous
different settings during the 2008 financial crisis, including commercial
paper, repo transactions, warehouse lines of credit, and securities lending
agreements.170
In fact, there are nearly infinite ways to structure short-term borrowing
arrangements. For example, the sale or lease of any economic interest can be
transformed into collateralized borrowing through contractual
engineering.171 Securities lending and repo transactions exploited this fact in
different ways, but they are merely specific examples of the broader
principle.172 It is therefore nearly impossible to define in advance all of the
different forms that short-term borrowing might take, at least with the
specificity that activities-based regulation requires.173
169. See supra Section I.C.
170. ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 1, at 445–48; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM 52–77
(2016).
171. It is for this precise reason that Article 9 of the UCC, which governs many types of
collateralized lending, ultimately employs a broad standard to define its scope—it applies to any
transaction that creates a security interest, “regardless of form.” See LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 27–32 (8th ed. 2015).
172. For a detailed account of the legal and institutional architecture of some of these instruments,
see Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. REG. 363, 387–406 (2016).
173. Morgan Ricks offers one definition of short-term borrowing. See RICKS, supra note 170, at
223–47. But Ricks’ proposal—to treat all short-term borrowing as a type of money creation—does not
require him to differentiate among the numerous different sub-classes of short-term debt. Any activitiesbased regulatory strategy would have to do this under the current regulatory framework, and could not
therefore rely on a broad standard that lumped together all different types of short-term borrowing.
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Not only are there innumerable potential types of short-term borrowing,
but short-term borrowing is not the only type of liability that can generate a
run. For instance, the crisis illustrated that run risk can also arise from any
transaction that potentially requires a firm to post increasing amounts of cash
collateral. AIG’s credit default swaps (“CDSs”) are the poster child for this
type of cash-collateral-driven run.174 These derivatives allowed
counterparties to insist on increasing amounts of cash collateral to back the
firm’s insurance-like promises as either the firm’s credit rating declined or
the mortgage-backed securities they referenced decreased in value.175
Starting in September 2007, Goldman Sachs and other counterparties
hounded AIG to post increasing cash collateral, ultimately forcing it to raise
$75 billion. Together with the run on AIG’s securities lending operations,
this pressure necessitated the largest bailout of a private firm in U.S.
history.176
The redeemable equity issued by MMMFs is yet another type of
liability that generated runs in the crisis but that was not short-term
borrowing. Open-end mutual funds generally do not borrow, but instead fund
themselves entirely with equity.177 Unlike any other types of equity,
however, investors can redeem their shares in those funds directly on
demand, at the fund’s net asset value (“NAV”).178 This fact created run risk
at MMMFs because unique accounting rules artificially allowed them to
maintain a NAV of one dollar even when the market value of their assets fell
below this level.179 As a result, investors ran from these funds by seeking to
withdraw their funds en masse once one large MMMF “broke the buck,”
disclosing that the value of its assets had fallen below the one dollar
threshold.180
So far, this litany of activities that create run risk consists of examples
that precipitated runs during the crisis. But innumerable potential activities
that were not yet in widespread use during the crisis could also create run
risk. For instance, many life insurers sell products that provide policyholders
with an immediate right to withdraw their investment or borrow against their
174. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 553–54. A CDS insures against the risk that securities
referenced in the agreement will fare poorly. See id.
175. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 344–55.
176. See id.
177. William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155,
1175 (2010).
178. Id.
179. FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 253.
180. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 505 (2009).

2019]

REGULATING ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES

1491

policy value.181 Other examples include guaranteed investment contracts,
funding agreements, and certain variable annuity contracts.182 As insurers’
product designs change in the future, still other innovations could trigger a
run.183
The prospect of new and unanticipated sources of run risk is particularly
troubling because financial regulators are almost certain to fail to identify
them ahead of time. Financial activities constantly evolve to evade
regulatory restrictions when doing so can produce significant financial
returns or lower costs, as in the case of cheap short-term funding.184 The
predictable result is that regulators will consistently be one step behind the
financial sector in identifying new and emerging sources of run risk.185
ii. An Activities-Based Approach Cannot Effectively Prevent the
Accumulation of Run Risk
Even if regulators could reliably identify all individual activities that
create run risks, an activities-based approach would still fall short of
preventing runs at nonbank financial firms. This is because an individual
firm’s exposure to a run ultimately depends on its aggregate reliance on all
activities that create run risk.
The inherently cumulative nature of run risk follows from the fact that
all of a firm’s potential sources of run risk are likely to be triggered when it
faces acute financial distress. This point is nicely illustrated by the collapse
of AIG. As AIG’s precarious financial position became clear throughout
2008, its CDS counterparties insisted that it post cash collateral on its
derivatives at the same time that its securities lending counterparties
terminated these transactions.186 It was hardly fortuitous that this run on AIG
implicated two different activities operated out of different subsidiaries; as
AIG’s counterparties realized the extent of the firm’s troubles, they ran
however they could to avoid experiencing losses if AIG defaulted.
An activities-based approach fails to address the risk that a combination
of activities—none of which creates excessive short-term liabilities
individually—might generate excessive run risk in the aggregate. Activities181. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1619–23.
182. See Anna Paulson et al., How Liquid Are U.S. Life Insurance Liabilities?, CHI. FED LETTER
(2012), http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/Chicago-fed-letter/2012/September-302.
183. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1619–23.
184. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1830–34.
185. See, e.g., Examining How the Dodd-Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded
Bailouts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 80 (2013) (statement of Richard W.
Fisher, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas).
186. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 554.
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based regulation generally seeks to limit the risks of an activity that creates
short-term liabilities by, for instance, requiring that firms engaging in the
activity maintain specified levels of liquid assets or creating mechanisms by
which counterparties’ capacity to run is suspended.187 In doing so, activitiesbased regulation sets these safeguards only by reference to the prospect that
the underlying activity, considered in isolation, might generate a run. In the
absence of a complementary entity-based regime, however, activities-based
regulation cannot calibrate customized safeguards for an individual firm’s
cumulative activities, in the aggregate.
The inability of an activities-based approach to appropriately limit
cumulative run risk is exacerbated by the fact that this risk is a byproduct of
interactions between firms’ liabilities and assets.188 A seemingly reasonable
amount of short-term debt might create dangerous run risk for a firm that
overinvests in highly illiquid assets. For this reason, even a single activity
that creates potential short-term liabilities may have a very different valance
when it is combined with other activities that are not ordinarily considered
systemic in isolation. An activities-based approach is limited in its capacity
to respond to such interactions between the asset and liability sides of firms’
balance sheets.
iii. An Activities-Based Approach Cannot Police Against Potentially
Systemic Interconnections Between Firms
The prospect that a nonbank firm will transmit systemic risk through
the counterparty channel is linked to other factors in addition to its
susceptibility to a run, including the identity of the firm’s major
counterparties and the size of those counterparties’ exposures to the firm.189
An activities-based approach, however, is unable to police these indicators
of an individual firm’s interconnectedness with the broader financial system.
This is for several reasons. First, a firm’s interconnectedness turns on the
cumulative impact of its numerous activities. Innumerable financial
activities—ranging from ordinary borrowing, to securities management, to
derivatives, to the issuance of insurance policies—expose a nonbank firm’s
counterparties to the risk that the firm might fail.190 Second, the one-sizefits-all nature of an activities-based approach means that it is not sensitive to
the prospect that a specific activity may pose heightened systemic risk at a
187. The SEC’s reforms of MMMFs provide examples of these strategies. See supra notes 92–94.
188. See supra Section I.C.
189. See id.
190. A sufficiently large and interconnected nonbank financial firm might generate counterparty
risk even if it did not experience a run. For instance, the sudden revelation of accounting fraud or
manipulation at a large nonbank firm could potentially reproduce each of the salient features of a run.
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particular firm in light of its other activities and counterparty exposures. For
instance, writing a CDS on a reference entity poses much greater risks if the
firm also owns a large amount of the reference entity’s bonds. Third, U.S.
activities-based regulation is often fragmented and unable to grasp the full
magnitude of a company’s counterparty exposure.191 It is presumably for
these reasons that the IAIS’s first report on designing an activities-based
approach for systemic risk in insurance provides that “with regards to
counterparty exposure . . . the IAIS tentatively concluded that [it is] mainly
[an] entity-specific concept[] . . . .”192
Ultimately, preventing the potentially systemic buildup of counterparty
risk at individual nonbanks is impossible without considering the sum of all
a firm’s activities and its potential threat to counterparties. This is true even
though only certain types of activities can generate runs, as such activities
are numerous, are difficult to identify ex ante, and pose cumulative risks to
nonbank firms.
2. The Asset Liquidation Channel
As suggested in Part I, the transmission of systemic risk through the
asset liquidation channel often involves correlated trading behavior among
multiple firms with similar asset holdings.193 But an individual firm, rather
than a cluster of many firms, could play a dominant role in transmitting
systemic risk through the asset liquidation channel if it owned a large
percentage of a certain asset class relative to the overall market. An
individual firm could only accomplish this if it maintained a large percentage
of a certain asset class relative to the overall market, and the other major
holders of that asset class were also major financial institutions. Under these
conditions, the firm’s sudden efforts to dump its portfolio during a crisis
could topple those other institutions by wiping out their capital.194
An activities-based approach cannot prevent this possibility, for two
reasons. First, as noted above, activities-based regulation targets a specific
activity, such as a type of short-term liability, in isolation.195 In many cases,
however, firms fail to design their liability structures to take into account the
risks from their investment strategies. Even when an explicit link between a
firm’s assets and liabilities does exist—as in insurance, where firms
191. See infra Section IV.B.
192. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 117.
193. See supra Part I. An activities-based approach is generally necessary to address the
transmission of systemic risk in this manner. See infra Section V.B.1.
194. See supra Section I.C.
195. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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generally seek to match asset and liability durations196—a firm may manage
to accumulate a large enough position to affect prices in a particular asset
class.197 Second, a firm is more likely to sell illiquid assets during a crisis if
it is forced to do so as a result of a run. As discussed above, an activitiesbased approach cannot prevent the accumulation of excessive run risk at a
nonbank financial firm.198
B. AN ENTITY-BASED APPROACH IS WELL STRUCTURED TO LIMIT THE
COSTS OF SYSTEMIC INSOLVENCIES
In contrast to an activities-based approach, FSOC’s entity-based
designation regime is reasonably well designed to limit the risk that firms
will experience systemic insolvencies through either the counterparty or
asset liquidation channels. Moreover, while identifying systemically
significant nonbank firms is challenging, this task is much more manageable
than correctly identifying all systemically significant activities ex ante. In
addition, an entity-based approach mitigates financial stability risks if a
systemic nonbank were to fail, supplements traditional regulatory regimes
that lack a macroprudential orientation, and can improve the effectiveness of
activities-based regulation. Meanwhile, many of the criticisms levied against
FSOC’s designation authority both are overblown and have been addressed.
1. Designation Limits the Risk that Firms Will Experience a Systemic
Failure
In contrast to an activities-based approach, an entity-based regime is
inherently focused on the cumulative impact of a firm’s activities across the
entire financial conglomerate, as well as interactions between its assets and
liabilities. Each of the core tools of entity-based nonbank SIFI regulation is
oriented toward these objectives. For instance, consolidated risk-based
capital requirements and leverage limits ensure that SIFIs maintain a
sufficient capital cushion to absorb potential losses.199 Liquidity rules require
a SIFI to hold a minimum amount of liquid assets to protect against runs and
196. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 126
(6th ed. 2015).
197. This could occur even if the law imposes caps on the percentage of a firm’s capital and surplus
that can be devoted to that holding.
198. See supra Section III.A.1.ii.
199. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018). For a discussion of how capital requirements protect
financial firms from insolvency, see ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 94−95 (2013). The Federal Reserve has
not yet finalized rules implementing several nonbank SIFI standards mandated in Dodd-Frank, including
capital and leverage requirements.
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reduce the likelihood that it will have to sell illiquid assets in a fire sale.200
Stress tests simulate adverse economic conditions to ensure that SIFIs could
withstand a severe downturn.201 And corporate governance reforms focus on
improving enterprise risk management across SIFIs’ operations.202
Supervision of nonbank SIFIs by the Federal Reserve, which is charged
with carrying out the entity-based approach to financial stability, is also
inherently focused on the prospect that a firm’s cumulative risk profile could
result in a systemic insolvency.203 The Federal Reserve’s supervisory
authority gives it the discretion to tailor the heightened prudential
requirements described above to the circumstances of each individual firm’s
systemic risk profile.204 Additionally, the Federal Reserve’s uniquely
prominent role in financial regulation means that it often has the capability
to observe both sides of a nonbank SIFI’s counterparty transactions.205
Entity-based nonbank SIFI regulation can also prevent systemic
insolvencies indirectly, by causing designated firms to shed risk in an effort
to jettison their SIFI designations. The various extra regulatory restrictions
and costs that designated firms experience are significant.206 For this reason,
nonbanks that are designated as SIFIs have strong incentives to cease
activities that may create the prospect of a systemic failure.207 This reality
200. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A)(ii).
201. See id. § 5365(i); see also Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2237–40 (2014).
202. See Proposed Guidance on Supervisory Expectations for Boards of Directors, 82 Fed. Reg.
37,219, 37,225 (Aug. 9, 2017). Oversight of an institution’s board of directors and independent risk
management function is a key element of an entity-based approach. These governance mechanisms are
uniquely positioned to prevent excessive risk-taking or misconduct that could transmit financial
instability. See Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial
Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 888–91 (2018); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance
Reform in Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 976−77
(2018). An entity-based approach allows regulators to monitor the effectiveness of a nonbank SIFI’s
corporate governance through regular on-site supervision. See infra Section III.B.5.
203. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners International Insurance Forum: Insurance Companies
and the Role of the Federal Reserve (May 20, 2016) (available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/tarullo20160520a.pdf).
204. This power inheres in large part from the Federal Reserve’s authority to take enforcement
actions—including cease-and-desist orders—against nonbank SIFIs for unsafe and unsound practices.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
205. As activities-based regulation is currently configured in the United States, it does not always
have sight lines into both sides of a transaction. For example, when an insurer engages in securities
lending with an outside broker-dealer, state insurance regulators will be able to observe the insurance
company’s side of the transaction, but not the broker-dealer’s side.
206. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1851–55.
207. Id. Aaron Levine and Joshua Macey suggest that nonbank SIFI designations are akin to a
Pigouvian tax because they incentivize designated firms to divest their riskiest business lines. See Aaron
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has been vividly demonstrated with respect to firms that have been
designated as SIFIs by FSOC: GE Capital and AIG both restructured their
businesses in successful bids to shed their status as nonbank SIFIs.208 Even
MetLife, which embraced a successful legal and political strategy to escape
its status as a nonbank SIFI, simultaneously reduced its participation in
certain potentially systemic activities.209
2. Regulators Can More Easily Target Systemic Entities than Systemic
Activities
An entity-based approach is inherently more effective than an activitiesbased approach at preventing systemic insolvencies for a second set of
reasons: an entity-based regime is much easier to target effectively.210 As
discussed above, it is extremely difficult for regulators to anticipate new and
emerging systemic activities.211 Relative to these difficulties, FSOC and
other financial regulators are much more likely to be able to consistently and
accurately identify nonbank SIFIs. Although the distinction between firms
that are systemically significant and those that are not is notoriously blurry,
it is generally straightforward to identify which firms are plausibly close to
the line and which are clearly on one side or the other.212 Moreover, both
U.S. and international actors have developed detailed frameworks for
identifying systemically significant firms, which have produced similar
results as alternative methodologies.213
Additionally, an entity-based approach need not perfectly distinguish
M. Levine & Joshua C. Macey, Note, Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1336, 1381
(2018).
208. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1851–55.
209. Id. In contrast to its former SIFI peers, Prudential neither shrunk nor substantially simplified
itself to win a rescission of its designation. Instead, Prudential calculated—correctly—that its designation
would be rescinded when FSOC’s membership changed, despite maintaining its size and complexity. See
Kress, supra note 109, at 174; see also Jeremy Kress, Prudential Hasn’t Earned the Right to Shed SIFI
Label, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Mar. 13, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
prudential-hasnt-earned-the-right-to-shed-sifi-label.
210. See Gregg Gelzinis, Don’t Put SIFI Designations on the Back Burner, AM. BANKER:
BANKTHINK (Jan. 29, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dont-put-sifi-design
ations-on-the-back-burner.
211. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
212. See FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.
213. See supra Section II.A; see also Acharya et al., supra note 63, at 39 (identifying Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch among the top 10 systemically
risky financial firms in 2006 to 2007 in back-testing of authors’ marginal expected shortfall approach to
systemic risk); Christian Brownlees & Robert F. Engle, SRISK: A Conditional Capital Shortfall Measure
of Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 48, 62–63 (2017) (finding that back-testing of authors’ SRISK
metric identified Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac as top
systemic risk contributors as early as the beginning of 2005).
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between nonbanks that are systemically significant and those which are not
to deter nonbanks from seeking out systemic risk.214 To the contrary, so long
as the designation process is even roughly accurate, nonbank firms will have
strong incentives to avoid pursuing strategies that could result in their failure
propagating systemic risk. This is because the mere prospect of being
designated as a SIFI—and thus facing increased regulatory restrictions and
compliance burdens—creates real risks and uncertainties for firms, which
they will seek to avoid.
By contrast, an activities-based approach in isolation affirmatively
incentivizes nonbanks to engage in regulatory arbitrage by seeking out
activities that have not been identified or appropriately regulated. Doing so
offers all the ordinary potential benefits to firms of systemic risk—the ability
to reap the upside reward of risk, while externalizing some of the
downside—but only limited downside. This is because the firm does not bear
the full costs of engaging in such an activity until it is regulated
appropriately. Financial firms are accustomed to adjusting as the regulatory
landscape changes, and they can choose either to cease engaging in a newly
identified systemic activity or to conform to the new regulatory standards.
And unlike in an entity-based regime, either choice can be implemented
immediately because they do not usually require affirmative approval by
regulators.
3. An Entity-Based Approach Limits Harm When a Systemic Nonbank
Fails
Entity-based regulation not only reduces the likelihood that a
systemically important nonbank will fail, it also limits the macroeconomic
consequences if such a firm were to experience distress. The Dodd-Frank
Act established the OLA to resolve financial firms that prove systemically
important while limiting the harm to the broader economy. 215 The OLA is
unlikely to succeed, however, without ex ante entity-based nonbank
regulation.
The OLA expands the FDIC’s traditional commercial bank resolution
powers by authorizing it to resolve any financial company whose disorderly
collapse would impair U.S. financial stability.216 It thus aims to prevent a
recurrence of the destabilizing uncertainty that took place in the aftermath of
214. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1858.
215. See 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2018).
216. See id. § 5383(b)(2). The decision to place a financial company into OLA requires a
recommendation by at least two-thirds of the members of the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC board
of directors, as well as the Treasury Secretary (in consultation with the President). See id. § 5383(a)–(b).
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Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, when many of Lehman’s subsidiaries
ceased operations.217 In an OLA proceeding, the FDIC would transfer a
distressed financial conglomerate’s operating subsidiaries to a new bridge
company.218 The FDIC would capitalize the new bridge company by wiping
out the firm’s original shareholders and replacing unsecured creditors’
claims on the original holding company with the bridge company’s equity
securities.219 In theory, this process would allow the company’s subsidiaries
to continue their critical operations, while forcing the firm’s original
stockholders and debt holders to absorb losses.220
Policymakers may place any failing nonbank into an OLA proceeding
if its collapse would adversely affect financial stability, even if FSOC had
not previously designated the firm as a SIFI.221 Ex ante SIFI designation,
however, is critical to a successful orderly liquidation for three reasons.
First, ex ante entity-based regulation requires the firm, and enables
regulators, to prepare in advance for the firm’s OLA resolution, should one
be necessary. Dodd-Frank directs designated nonbank SIFIs to develop an
annual resolution plan, or “living will,” explaining how the firm could be
wound down.222 A nonbank SIFI’s living will provides regulators crucial
insight into the firm’s legal entity structure, its key operations, and
management information systems that allows the FDIC to plan, in advance,
if it must resolve the firm through OLA.223 Moreover, if the FDIC or Federal
Reserve concludes that the nonbank SIFI is too complex to be resolved in an
orderly fashion, the agencies may object to its living will and compel the
firm to simplify its organizational structure.224 Thus, ex ante entity-based
regulation enhances the likelihood that a systemically important nonbank can
be resolved with minimal systemic externalities.225
Second, ex ante entity-based regulation can help ensure that a nonbank
SIFI holds sufficient financial resources to facilitate its orderly resolution.
Recall that in an OLA proceeding, the FDIC would convert the original
217. See generally The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the DoddFrank Act, 5 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2011, at 31 [hereinafter Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers].
218. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,616 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013).
219. See id. at 76,618.
220. See Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie Massman, The Resolution of Distressed Financial
Conglomerates, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 48, 49–50 (2017).
221. See id. at 58.
222. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(1) (2018).
223. See Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 217, at 43.
224. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(4).
225. See Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra note 217, at 41.
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holding company’s long-term creditors into equity holders in the new bridge
company.226 This recapitalization allows the holding company’s
subsidiaries—for instance, its commercial bank, broker-dealer, or insurance
companies—to continue operating.227 If, however, the holding company
does not have sufficient long-term debt to recapitalize the bridge company,
then the firm’s subsidiaries will be shut down and resolved under applicable
insolvency laws—the precise outcome that the OLA seeks to avoid.228 Under
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve may require a designated nonbank SIFI to
issue minimum amounts of long-term debt to enhance its resolvability.229
Without ex ante entity-based regulation, however, a systemically important
nonbank is unlikely to hold the financial resources necessary for an orderly
resolution.230
Third, ex ante entity-based oversight gives the Federal Reserve advance
warning of an impending failure through the supervision process and fuller
information about counterparties’ exposure to the firm. This would help
prevent a repeat of the situation with Bear Stearns and AIG in 2008, in which
the Federal Reserve had to fly blind when both companies approached it for
emergency bailouts because it was neither company’s supervisor.231 In
today’s framework, ex ante supervision would help policymakers assess
whether such a firm should be placed into OLA.232
In sum, ex ante entity-based regulation is critical if the post-crisis
framework for resolving systemically important firms is to function as
intended. Unless FSOC designates systemically important firms as nonbank
SIFIs, the OLA is not likely to prevent the distress of such firms from
destabilizing the broader economy.233
226. See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also John Crawford, Credible Losers: A
Regulatory Design for Prudential Market Discipline, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 127–32, 137–41 (2017).
227. See Jackson & Massman, supra note 220, at 53.
228. See Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,623 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013).
229. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(B)(iv) (authorizing the Federal Reserve to establish prudential
standards as it deems appropriate for nonbank SIFIs). The Federal Reserve has mandated that global
systemically important banks hold minimum amounts of unsecured long-term debt and other lossabsorbing instruments. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.62 (2019). The Federal Reserve has not yet proposed
comparable standards for nonbank SIFIs.
230. See Jackson & Massman, supra note 220, at 59.
231. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 88–90, 105–07.
232. See generally John Crawford, Resolution Triggers for Systemically Important Financial
Institutions, 97 NEB. L. REV. 101 (2018) (proposing a solvency-based trigger for OLA).
233. Notably, the Treasury Department has acknowledged the importance of entity-based regulation
to facilitate the potential resolution of systemic financial market utilities. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 166–67 (2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-Capital-Markets-
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4. An Entity-Based Approach Supplements Traditional Regulatory
Regimes That Do Not Address or Sufficiently Prevent Systemic Risk
Entity-based designation is necessary because most nonbank sectoral
regulatory regimes have not implemented reliable macroprudential
regulatory tools of the type that the Federal Reserve deploys for designated
firms. Insurance regulation is the most straightforward example. In the
United States, insurance regulation has long been the responsibility of the
states, with little federal involvement.234 But the state-based system of
insurance regulation suffers from serious flaws with respect to systemic risk
regulation, which became apparent during the crisis. Most critically, the U.S.
system of insurance regulation lacks well-developed, consolidated
regulation and supervision of insurance holding companies.235 And state
regulators have limited experience with or expertise in monitoring risks
arising from an insurance conglomerate’s noninsurance subsidiaries or from
the interactions of the conglomerate’s component parts.236 Meanwhile, in
most states, the insurance commissioner is subject to a narrow regulatory
mandate to protect an insurance subsidiary’s policyholders, not to limit
financial stability risks.237
Implementing an entity-based designation regime in settings like
insurance, where a nonbank firm’s baseline sectoral regime is not oriented
to systemic risk concerns, is relatively straightforward. This is because
FSOC’s designation regime layers enhanced macroprudential regulation on
top of an entity’s baseline regulatory regime. Although this creates some
coordination challenges between the Federal Reserve and a firm’s baseline
regulator, these challenges are generally manageable and have improved
gradually as the Federal Reserve has developed working relationships with
designated firms’ sectoral regulators, particularly state insurance
FINAL-FINAL.pdf. Ex ante entity-based regulation of systemically important nonbanks is equally
imperative to ensure that they can be resolved in an orderly fashion, if necessary.
234. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 196, at 107–11.
235. See Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Speech Accepting the ALI Early
Career Scholar Award: The Failures of State Insurance Regulation 5–6 (May 24, 2017) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2974099). After the crisis, several states have
adopted laws purporting to authorize their insurance commissioners to supervise, on a consolidated basis,
insurance groups domiciled in their states. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:27A-5.2 (West 2019). State
agencies, however, lack the appropriate jurisdiction, incentives, and resources to regulate multinational
insurance companies effectively. See Kress, supra note 209; Schwarcz, supra, at 5–6.
236. See Schwarcz, supra note 235, at 6.
237. A state insurance commission generally focuses on whether an insurance subsidiary maintains
sufficient financial resources to satisfy customer claims. This is a narrower goal than preserving financial
stability. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1627–34.
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regulators.238
5. Entity-Based Regulation Can Improve the Effectiveness of ActivitiesBased Regulation
As suggested above, regulators implementing an activities-based
approach face an immense challenge in identifying new and emerging types
of systemically risky activities, particularly given that firms are constantly
innovating to avoid regulatory burdens.239 An entity-based approach to
financial stability can mitigate these shortcomings of activities-based
regulation both by helping regulators to identify potentially systemic
activities ex ante, and by allowing them to assess how well activities-based
reforms are curbing risk.
An entity-based approach produces these benefits through regular onand off-site supervision of nonbank SIFIs. Continuous monitoring—a
hallmark of entity-based systemic risk oversight—allows FSOC members
and Federal Reserve officials to observe the impact of different activities
across time.240 This unique vantage point allows supervisors to more quickly
identify troubling activities. For instance, if supervisors observe that several
nonbank SIFIs are suddenly engaging in a new activity at accelerating rates,
this is likely to trigger enhanced scrutiny of the activity itself, in a way that
might otherwise be overlooked.241 Likewise, firm-wide examinations and
continuous off-site monitoring can help supervisors detect when nonbank
SIFIs respond to activities-based rules by changing their business models to
continue taking systemic risks. In this way, regular entity-based nonbank
SIFI supervision can help overcome some of the limitations inherent in an
activities-based approach.
6. Criticisms of FSOC’s Designation Regime Are Overblown and Have
Been Addressed
Critics of FSOC’s entity-based designation regime have complained
that it creates an uneven playing field, is opaque, and imposes bank-centric
238. See generally Insurance Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Ins. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. (2016) (statement of Thomas Sullivan, Associate Director, Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, Department of Banking Supervision and Regulation).
239. See supra Section III.A.1.
240. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 12-17, CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION
FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 9–10 (2012) (discussing Federal Reserve supervision
of nonbank SIFIs).
241. See Matthew C. Turk, The Convergence of Insurance with Banking and Securities Industries,
and the Limits of Regulatory Arbitrage in Finance, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 967, 1040, 1053 (2015).
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rules on nonbanks.242 Each of these criticisms, however, has limited
persuasive force.
First, the fact that FSOC’s entity-based approach creates an uneven
playing field for designated firms is a feature, not a bug. It helps to ensure
that nonbank firms have incentives to avoid being designated in the first
place, and to shed their status quickly if they are so designated.243 Moreover,
the costs of SIFI designation are less unfair than critics suggest, as they help
offset the funding advantages that come along with being perceived as
systemically important.244 Finally, designated firms can avoid these costs by
taking steps to limit their systemic importance, a fact that is well illustrated
by the de-designation of nonbank SIFIs, even under the Obama
Administration.245
Second, allegations of FSOC’s opacity are overblown, and in any event,
FSOC has increased its transparency in recent years. As with all broad legal
standards, the FSOC designation scheme necessarily sacrifices predictability
in favor of flexibility and adaptability.246 But within these constraints, FSOC
has taken numerous steps to enhance the transparency of its process. For
instance, it developed a formulaic quantitative test to select only a small
subset of all nonbank financial firms for potential designation.247 In response
to continued industry concerns, it began informing firms earlier when they
were being considered for designation, and it formalized its process for
annually reevaluating such designations.248 FSOC also began to release more
detailed explanations for its designation decisions that provide much clearer
indications of how firms can achieve de-designation. In sum, while FSOC
can surely further improve the transparency of its designation process,
critics’ concerns in this domain are no longer persuasive.
Finally, critics’ claims that designation results in the imposition of
bank-centric rules on nonbanks are inaccurate. In response to these concerns,
Congress passed the Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014,
which specifically authorized the Federal Reserve to tailor its capital
standards for insurers to the distinctive risks posed by such firms.249 Over
242. See supra Section II.A.
243. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1851–55.
244. See supra Section I.B.
245. See supra Section II.A.
246. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 208–09 (2015).
247. See FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.III.a.
248. See Examining Insurance Capital Rules and FSOC Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec., Ins. & Investments of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 7–8 (2015)
(statement of Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School).
249. Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-279, sec. 2, § 5371,
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the course of the last decade, the Federal Reserve has also developed a
specialized team of insurance-focused experts to supervise nonbank SIFIs.
The head of this group has repeatedly emphasized in Congressional
testimony that the agency goes to great lengths to recognize the distinct
regulatory issues associated with nonbank financial firms like insurers, and
to tailor its approach accordingly.250 And, in fact, the Federal Reserve’s
proposed insurance SIFI capital standards reflect thoughtful consideration of
the differences between bank and insurance company business models.251
Once again, therefore, whatever the merit of critics’ concerns about the bankcentric nature of the Federal Reserve at the time of Dodd-Frank’s passage,
these arguments hold little force in the continued debate over the
appropriateness of an entity-based approach.
***
In sum, entity-based systemic risk regulation is uniquely capable of
preventing catastrophic nonbank failures. Nonbank SIFI oversight takes into
account the cumulative effect of all of a firm’s activities, is relatively easy to
target, and is necessary to limit the fallout if a systemic firm were to become
insolvent. An activities-based approach, by contrast, is severely limited
along these dimensions, as it focuses on a firm’s activities in isolation and is
difficult to target effectively due to constant efforts by firms to avoid
regulatory restrictions. Entity-based nonbank SIFI designations are therefore
critical to prevent a recurrence of the systemic nonbank insolvencies from
2008.
IV. AN EFFECTIVE ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH IS
IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Trump Administration’s proposal to deemphasize FSOC’s entitybased authority in favor of an activities-based approach is misguided for
another reason. Although it can theoretically combat some types of systemic
risk,252 activities-based regulation is immensely difficult to implement
domestically as a practical matter. This is a direct result of the United States’
deeply fragmented legal and regulatory framework. Consequently, effective
128 Stat. 3017, 3018−19.
250. See, e.g., The Impact of Domestic Regulatory Standards on the U.S. Insurance Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 2−3 (2015)
(statement of Thomas Sullivan, Associate Director, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Department of
Banking Supervision and Regulation).
251. See Capital Requirements for Supervised Institutions Significantly Engaged in Insurance
Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,631, 38,632−37 (June 14, 2016).
252. See infra Section V.B for a discussion of how activities-based regulation could limit some
types of systemic risk, if properly configured.
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activities-based systemic risk regulation might be plausible in foreign
jurisdictions with a more centralized financial regulatory scheme. But it is
not in the United States.
Activities-based systemic risk regulation faces two significant obstacles
in the United States. First, FSOC lacks legal authority to order activitiesbased regulation on its own. Second, jurisdictional gaps and fragmentation
among the primary financial regulators will impede efforts to curb systemic
risk through activities-based regulation.
A. FSOC CANNOT IMPLEMENT ACTIVITIES-BASED REGULATION
DIRECTLY
FSOC faces a threshold challenge in implementing an activities-based
approach: the Council has no legal authority to promulgate activities-based
rules. Instead, FSOC’s activities-based authority is solely precatory. As
discussed above, FSOC may recommend that the primary financial
regulators adopt specific activities-based standards under section 120 of
Dodd-Frank.253 But nothing requires an agency to follow this
recommendation. Rather, the agency is free to decline FSOC’s suggestion
after “explain[ing] in writing” why the agency determined not to follow it.254
An agency might resist implementing activities-based regulations at
FSOC’s urging for several reasons. For one, an agency might be captured by
the financial sector it is supposed to regulate.255 When the SEC initially
resisted FSOC’s recommendation for stronger regulation of MMMFs, for
example, some commentators attributed the SEC’s intransigence to the
MMMF industry’s influence over SEC policymaking.256 Second, an agency
might decline a recommendation by the Council to protect its regulatory turf.
Financial regulators are notorious for guarding their jurisdiction, and an
agency might therefore resist perceived encroachment by the Council.257
Third, an agency might not be inclined to spend its resources and political
capital on drafting, implementing, and enforcing a rule that a different entity
believes is necessary.258
253. See supra Section II.A.
254. 12 U.S.C. § 5330(c)(2) (2018).
255. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 537, 541 (2012).
256. See Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 701, 707–10 (2017); Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money
Market Fund Reform, 93 N.C. L. REV. 935, 940–41 (2015).
257. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States
Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2005).
258. That appears to be what happened when FSOC urged the SEC to adopt heightened regulations
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Because its activities-based authority is solely precatory, FSOC’s only
recourse when an agency declines to follow its recommendation is to
designate—or threaten to designate—nonbanks within the agency’s
jurisdiction.259 The threat of such a designation might convince an agency to
adopt the Council’s proposed activities-based regulations because “[f]ew
agencies relish the prospect of losing control over firms . . . that they
traditionally regulate . . . .”260 However, if the entity-based approach
continues to erode—whether as a result of FSOC finalizing its proposed
procedural barriers to nonbank SIFI designations, or otherwise—such threats
will lack credibility, leading to agencies resisting the Council’s activitiesbased recommendations with impunity.261
B. FRAGMENTED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION PRECLUDES AN EFFECTIVE
ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH
Even if FSOC could order federal regulators to adopt activities-based
rules, existing jurisdictional barriers would prevent an activities-based
approach from effectively curbing nonbank systemic risk. As currently
configured, the U.S. regulatory structure is simply incapable of overseeing
systemically important financial activities on a system-wide basis.
Jurisdictional fragmentation is pervasive in U.S. financial regulation,
with both gaps and overlaps in the regulatory framework.262 In some cases,
no federal regulator has the requisite authority to impose activities-based
for MMMFs. In response to FSOC’s recommendation, the SEC implemented modest MMMF regulations
that were not as strong as FSOC had initially proposed. Key members of FSOC expressed displeasure
that the SEC’s rules did not go as far as FSOC intended. See Allen, supra note 5, at 1119.
259. Notably, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner warned the SEC that FSOC would consider
designating certain asset managers as nonbank SIFIs if the SEC did not implement stricter regulations for
MMMFs. See Martha L. Cochran et al., Money Market Fund Reform: SEC Rulemaking in the FSOC Era,
2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 861, 916–40 (2015). This threat convinced the SEC to adopt parts of FSOC’s
recommended MMMF regulations, but many observers criticized the SEC for weakening the Council’s
proposal. See, e.g., supra note 258; Sarah N. Lynch, SEC’s Long Path to Money Market Fund Reform
Ends in Compromise, REUTERS (July 22, 2014, 9:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-secmoneyfunds/secs-long-path-to-money-market-fund-reform-ends
-in-compromise-idUSKBN0FS08E20140723.
260. Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1861.
261. Alternatively, FSOC could attempt to “name and shame” an agency for failing to comply with
the Council’s recommendation. See Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of “Name-andShame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1091 (2012). As a regulatory
tool, however, naming and shaming suffers from critical limitations. See generally id. (discussing
shortcomings of a naming-and-shaming strategy in cross-border resolutions). For example, independent
financial regulators might be unresponsive to such a strategy because they are politically insulated.
262. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 39, 49–56 (2009).
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regulations on relevant nonbank actors, leading to potentially systemic
activities going unpoliced. In other cases, multiple federal regulators share
jurisdiction, which can produce inconsistent enforcement and
implementation patterns as well as critical information gaps.263 Taken
together, these structural deficiencies seriously undermine the practical
capacity of an activities-based approach to effectively protect financial
stability.
This Section details these critical structural deficiencies in the United
States’ capacity to regulate potentially systemic financial activities. To do
so, it focuses on eight areas where FSOC has identified activities that could
potentially threaten U.S. financial stability. Each of these sets of activities
has one thing in common: there is no single federal regulator that can oversee
them for systemic risk across the entire financial sector.
1. Gaps in the U.S. Regulatory Framework Undermine Regulation of
Systemic Activities
Important segments of the financial sector lack effective systemic risk
regulatory oversight because of gaps in the U.S. regulatory framework.
These gaps persist for several reasons. Some are attributable to divisions of
authority between federal and state regulators. Others developed when
industry participants fought for, and won, exemptions from regulatory
oversight. Still, other gaps emerged as new industries evolved that legacy
regulatory structures were not equipped to oversee. Because of these gaps,
even if FSOC were to recommend enhanced regulations for a particular
financial activity, there is no guarantee that a primary federal financial
regulator would be able to act on FSOC’s recommendation. This Section
examines how gaps in insurance, hedge fund, and fintech oversight preclude
an effective activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk.
i. Insurance Activities
Gaps in insurance regulation demonstrate the limits of FSOC’s
activities-based authority. Since the financial crisis, FSOC has identified a
wide range of insurance company activities as potentially systemically
risky—for example, life insurance policies with cash surrender or
redemption rights,264 guaranteed investment contracts,265 captive
263.
(2017).
264.
265.

See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 444–46
See, e.g., METLIFE DESIGNATION, supra note 84, at 13–14, 16–18, 22–23.
See id. at 11–12, 18.
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reinsurance,266 and financial guaranty insurance.267 Yet effective activitiesbased regulation of these types of transactions for systemic risk is virtually
impossible because of jurisdictional gaps in U.S. insurance regulation.
As discussed above, the states have traditionally regulated U.S.
insurance companies, with minimal federal involvement.268 States’
dominance in insurance regulation is rooted in the reverse preemption
provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that no federal law
may “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state laws governing the business of
insurance unless the federal law specifically relates to the business of
insurance.269
This system of state-based insurance regulation creates critical blind
spots in the regulation of potentially systemic activities. First, not only is
FSOC powerless to directly reform potentially systemic insurance activities
like the cash redemption or surrender terms of life insurance policies, but so
too are all other federal financial regulators. McCarran-Ferguson’s strictures
against federal insurance oversight strip federal agencies of almost all
authority to implement an FSOC recommendation regarding traditional
insurance activities.
Second, even if states were inclined to adopt an FSOC recommendation
to regulate an insurance company activity more stringently, they would face
severe coordination problems. States cannot consistently regulate potentially
systemic activities of insurance carriers due to the independent legal
authority of each individual state to regulate insurers conducting business in
its jurisdiction. Although states attempt to coordinate their laws, regulation,
and enforcement through the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (“NAIC”), these efforts are often inconsistent. States often
refuse to implement reforms, or else implement them differently than other
states.270
266. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 97–98 (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%202016%20Annual%20
Report.pdf.
267. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 62 (2011), https://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf.
268. See supra Section III.B.4.
269. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33, 34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15
(2018)). For a brief history of U.S. insurance regulation, see McCoy, supra note 5, at 1393–94.
270. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 196, at 112. And even when state laws and
regulations are harmonious, their enforcement by states often is not. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 33–34 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Documents/How%20to%20
Modernize%20and%20Improve%20the%20System%20of%20Insurance%20Regulation%20in%20the
%20US.pdf.
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Meanwhile, most states lack the legal authority to implement FSOCrecommended regulations for activities conducted outside of chartered
insurance subsidiaries. Although several states have enacted laws purporting
to authorize their insurance commissioners to supervise insurance groups
domiciled in their states on a consolidated basis, these statutes do not clearly
permit commissioners to regulate noninsurance or group-wide conduct.271
Even for those states with the legal authority to regulate activities conducted
outside of insurance entities, some of those activities are nevertheless off
limits due to federal preemption.272 And for activities that states could reach
at the group level, it is hardly clear that they would enforce such regulation
vigorously. State insurance commissions have limited experience
scrutinizing activities conducted within an insurance conglomerate’s
noninsurance subsidiaries, a task they did not even attempt prior to the
financial crisis.273 Further, states lack the system-wide information on
exposures outside of insurance that effective financial stability oversight
demands. Due to weak and untested group-wide supervision, insurance
conglomerates face few restrictions in conducting systemically risky
activities within their noninsurance affiliates—precisely what went wrong
with AIG’s CDS and securities lending operations.274
In sum, gaps in group-wide regulation of insurance conglomerates
would render an activities-based approach to insurance activities impotent.
In the absence of nonbank SIFI designations, therefore, FSOC cannot
effectively mitigate systemic risk arising from the insurance sector.
ii. Hedge Fund Activities
Regulatory gaps would likewise undermine an activities-based
approach to hedge funds. The near-failure of LTCM in 1998 and its need for
a government-orchestrated private bailout underscored the potential risk that
271. See Kress, supra note 209.
272. For instance, in 2008, state insurance regulators lacked jurisdiction over the CDS activities of
AIG Financial Products because the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision exerted field preemption over those
activities. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 157–58, 162, 221–23.
273. The FSB concluded that the U.S. state-based system of insurance regulation lacks the capacity
for consolidated group supervision. FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 32–38
(2013), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130827.pdf. In recent years, states have implemented
a variety of reforms intended to improve their group-level regulation. But these reforms rely almost
exclusively on qualitative rather than quantitative constraints and are susceptible to coordination
problems among state regulators. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 550. Moreover, these reforms are new,
still developing, and largely untested. See generally The Federal Government’s Role in the Insurance
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong.
(2017) (testimony of Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School) (discussing these
state reforms).
274. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 551–55.
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hedge fund activities can pose to the larger financial system.275 In
recognition of this continued threat, FSOC created an interagency working
group to monitor systemic risk in the hedge fund industry.276 Because of
statutory exemptions, however, hedge funds could avoid activities-based
systemic risk regulation absent congressional action.
Before the financial crisis, hedge funds largely escaped SEC regulation
because they operated outside of the purview of federal securities laws.
Hedge fund managers were not required to register with the SEC, nor were
the funds themselves subject to leverage limits and other prudential rules that
applied to other investment companies, like mutual funds.277 After the crisis,
Dodd-Frank imposed modest regulatory requirements on hedge fund
managers for the first time. Dodd-Frank required hedge fund managers to
register with the SEC, undergo periodic examinations, and file confidential
reports containing information on their funds’ leverage, counterparty
identities and exposures, and trading strategies.278
Dodd-Frank did not, however, impose prudential requirements on
hedge funds, nor did it authorize the SEC to adopt such regulations. Thus,
hedge funds remain exempt from the Investment Company Act of 1940—
the statutory authority that permits the SEC to regulate mutual funds and
other investment companies.279 The SEC, therefore, currently lacks power to
adopt activities-based reforms for hedge funds, such as restrictions on
specific trading practices.280 This inability to prudentially regulate hedge
funds would frustrate an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk.
Even if FSOC wanted to recommend activities-based regulations for hedge
funds’ activities, it would be fruitless because the SEC would not be able to
implement such rules.
iii. Fintech
Similarly, gaps in the U.S. regulatory framework would impede an
activities-based approach to emerging risks in the fintech sector. FSOC has
warned about financial stability threats from marketplace lending, payment
275. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10–17 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf.
276. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 96, at 20–21.
277. Id. at 14; Marco Bodellini, From Systemic Risk to Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings of
U.S. Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 417, 456–59 (2017).
278. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2018).
279. Bodellini, supra note 277, at 456–59.
280. See id.
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systems, virtual currencies, and other fintech innovations.281 According to
the Council, these technologies “create unanticipated risks and
vulnerabilities.”282 Despite these risks, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office reports that “some fintech companies may not be subject to
any . . . financial oversight . . . .”283 Accordingly, activities-based systemic
risk regulation of fintech would face serious challenges because, at least in
some cases, no primary federal financial regulatory agency would have
authority to implement FSOC’s activities-based recommendations.284
Rapid innovations in the fintech sector have revealed problematic gaps
in the oversight of these new technologies. Online marketplace lenders like
LendingClub and Prosper, which provide financing to consumers and small
businesses, are subject to a patchwork of state-based licensing requirements
but no federal regulation for safety and soundness or systemic risk.285
Likewise, nonbank payment services like PayPal and Venmo face
inconsistent state oversight, and some fintech payments firms could escape
federal and state regulation entirely.286 Meanwhile, Bitcoin, Ether, and other
cryptocurrencies avoid comprehensive federal oversight by the CFTC and
SEC, whose legal authority to regulate such products is debatable.287
Because federal jurisdiction in these areas is unclear at best, activities-based
systemic risk regulation might be unable to reach important segments of the
fintech market.
281. See FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 126–27. For a discussion of fintech’s
potential threats to financial stability, see generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech
as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 786−89 (2019); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018).
282. FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 6.
283. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-254, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: ADDITIONAL
STEPS BY REGULATORS COULD BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS AND AID REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 38
(2018) (emphasis added), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690803.pdf [hereinafter GAO FINTECH
REPORT].
284. For a discussion of gaps in fintech supervision, see Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection,
117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 875 (2019).
285. See GAO FINTECH REPORT, supra note 283, at 34; Brian Knight, Federalism and
Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 144 (2017). In July 2018, the
OCC created a federal charter for fintech firms, but the prospects for this charter type are uncertain. See
Rachel Witkowski, After Years of Debate, OCC to Offer Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER (July 31, 2018,
2:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/after-years-of-debate-occ-to-offer-fintech-charter.
286. See GAO FINTECH REPORT, supra note 283, at 38; Knight, supra note 285, at 153–61.
287. See Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
& Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 103 (2018) (statement of J. Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission); Anna Irrera, U.S. SEC Official Says Ether Not a Security,
Price Surges, REUTERS (June 14, 2018, 1:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cryptocurrenciesether/u-s-sec-official-says-ether-not-a-security-price-surges-idUSKBN1JA30Q.
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2. Fragmentation in the U.S. Regulatory Framework Impedes ActivitiesBased Regulation
While some parts of the financial sector fall within regulatory
interstices, other areas suffer from the opposite problem: they are subject to
regulation by many agencies. There are a number of reasons why
jurisdictional fragmentation pervades U.S. financial regulation. Often,
agencies split responsibility for functionally equivalent activities because
those activities are defined as different products. In other cases, different
agencies regulate different types of entities that engage in the same activity.
And in still other cases, multiple regulators oversee the same activities for
different risks. Finally, jurisdiction for a single activity or entity may be
spread across federal and state agencies.
This fragmentation poses serious challenges for activities-based
systemic risk regulation. Even if FSOC were to recommend activities-based
regulations, jurisdictional fragmentation would undermine regulators’
ability to enact and enforce uniform, consistent rules in five ways. First,
because each financial regulator focuses narrowly on its jurisdiction, no
agency has a complete view of the risks within the larger financial system.
Highly fragmented regulators therefore lack sufficient information to
implement a holistic, activities-based approach. Second, while FSOC could
attempt to coordinate among regulators, such coordination is inherently
limited because different agencies may nonetheless issue incompatible rules
for the same risk. Third, even if the agencies did adopt uniform rules,
differences in how the agencies interpret and enforce regulations could
undermine the goal of a uniform, consistent approach to systemic risk.
Fourth, regulators may engage in a race-to-the-bottom by adopting less
stringent regulations than other agencies, as each regulator competes to
expand its jurisdiction. Finally, under these circumstances, financial
institutions may seek out opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by moving
activities to less-regulated parts of the system.
These challenges vastly complicate activities-based regulation of
nonbank systemic risk. By way of example, this Section examines regulatory
fragmentation of five activities that pose potential financial stability risks:
mortgages, securities, derivatives, short-term funding, and cybersecurity. It
concludes that fragmentation would create serious challenges if FSOC were
to adopt an activities-based approach in any of these areas.
i. Mortgages
The central role of mortgages in both the 2008 financial crisis and the
1980s savings and loan crisis epitomizes a larger historical trend: the worst
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global financial crises have involved real estate bubbles fueled by lax lending
standards.288 Given the prominence of mortgage credit in financial crises,
one might expect to find a robust, unified framework for systemic risk
oversight of mortgages in the United States. But that is hardly the case. To
the contrary, federal mortgage regulation is highly fragmented.289 This
fragmentation renders an activities-based approach to mortgage regulation
practically unworkable.
Considerable fragmentation stems from differences in the regulation of
commercial and residential mortgages. Commercial mortgages are subject to
lighter federal regulation than their residential counterparts. Banks, which
dominate commercial mortgage lending, are supervised by the Federal
Reserve, the FDIC, or the OCC, depending on their charters, for solvency
risk.290 Separately, commercial mortgage-backed securitizations and REITs
undergo SEC regulation for risk to investors.291 Commercial mortgages
originated by independent nonbank lenders generally are not subject to
significant federal oversight.
Residential mortgages are subject to most of the same federal regulation
as commercial mortgages, plus more. For example, the CFPB regulates
residential mortgages—by depository institutions and nonbank lenders
alike—for market conduct risk to consumers. The CFPB has virtually
exclusive rulemaking authority in that respect, but shares responsibility for
supervision and enforcement with the federal prudential banking regulators
and the Federal Trade Commission.292 Although the CFPB Director sits on
FSOC and the CFPB’s rules play an important role in constraining systemic
risk from home mortgages, the Bureau frames its mission in terms of
protecting consumers, not mitigating threats to financial stability.293
Additional federal regulation of residential mortgages comes from two
288. See, e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY, at xliv–xlv, 158–62 (2009); see also Ryan Bubb & Prasad
Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall
Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1549–55 (2015).
289. There is some systemic risk regulation of mortgages, but it is limited in reach. The mortgage
activities of systemically important depository institutions and nonbank SIFIs are subject to financial
stability oversight by the Federal Reserve. Meanwhile, the joint risk retention rule requires sponsors of
certain mortgage-backed securities to retain risk. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. et al., Six Federal Agencies Jointly Approve Final Risk Retention Rule (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-236.html.
290. See, e.g., BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 174, 174 fig. 2.1–.5.
291. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2019).
292. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 584, 588–91.
293. See The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/the-bureau (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
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main financing channels: the government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal insurers and guarantors. The
GSEs, under the auspices of their regulator and conservator, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), impose extensive requirements on the
origination and servicing of the residential mortgage loans they buy.294
Meanwhile, the Federal Housing Administration, the Department of
Veterans Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, and the Rural Housing
Service (plus their financing arm, Ginnie Mae), heavily regulate the home
loans they insure or guarantee.295 In light of this fragmentation, even if FSOC
sought to implement consistent activities-based mortgage regulation for
systemic risk, it would be hard-pressed to succeed because that jurisdiction
is divided among so many federal agencies.
ii. Securities
U.S. securities regulation is likewise divided because Congress ceded
jurisdiction over some securities activities of commercial banks to the
traditional banking regulators—the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve.296
This dispersed authority over securities regulation must be taken into
account in any appraisal of an activities-based approach to systemic risk,
given the role of banking groups in securitization and the reorganization of
leading investment banks as financial holding companies under the watch of
the Federal Reserve.
In the banking sector, jurisdiction over securities regulation is split
between the SEC and federal banking regulators, and some federal securities
laws do not apply to banks at all. Congress exempted banks from important
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”),297 the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),298 the Investment Company Act
of 1940,299 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940300 because banks are
294. See Access the Single Family Guides, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/
singlefamily/index (last visited Sept. 19, 2019); Freddie Mac’s Selling and Servicing Requirements,
FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide (last visited Sept. 19, 2019); About
FHFA, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
295. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY HANDBOOK
4000.1 (2019), https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/4000.1hsgh.pdf; Statutes &
Regulations, GINNIE MAE, https://www.ginniemae.gov/about_us/what_we_do/Pages/statutes_regulat
ions.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
296. This discussion of securities regulation jurisdiction is heavily informed by Schooner, supra
note 9.
297. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74.
298. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-290, 48 Stat. 881.
299. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1 to -64 (2018)).
300. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
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subject to a comprehensive scheme of federal banking regulation.301 In other
cases, depository institutions are bound by federal securities laws, but
Congress entrusted oversight of those provisions with respect to banks and
sometimes thrifts to federal prudential banking regulators, not the SEC.302
This division of federal securities jurisdiction among the SEC and three
federal banking regulators impedes activities-based regulation of securities
for systemic risk. It creates one system of securities regulation for
independent nonbank securities market actors (who are regulated by the
SEC) and another one for banking companies (whose securities activities are
regulated by federal banking regulators and are sometimes exempt from
federal regulation altogether). These two systems produce inconsistent rules
and openings for regulatory arbitrage that obstruct a unified approach to
systemic risk in securities regulation.
iii. Derivatives
A similar fragmentation problem bedevils derivatives regulation.
Throughout their histories, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) have clashed repeatedly in jurisdictional battles over
securities and commodities markets.303 Since Dodd-Frank, the combative
agencies now share legal authority for derivatives that previously had been
traded over-the-counter (“OTC”), without regulation. In deference to the
historic division of authority between the CFTC over futures and the SEC
over securities, Congress gave jurisdiction over “swaps” to the CFTC and
§§ 80b-1 to -2).
301. For example, banks are exempt from broker-dealer registration, examination, and regulation,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)–(6), 78o-5(a)(1)(A)–(B), some SEC registration of clearing activities, id.
§ 78c(a)(23)(B); see also id. §§ 78c(a)(23)(A), 78q-1(b)(1), SEC regulation, supervision, and regulation
of common investment funds maintained in a fiduciary capacity, id. § 80a-3(c)(3), (6); see also id. § 80a8, and SEC registration, supervision, and regulation as investment advisors, id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A); see
also id. § 80a-2(a)(20).
302. Id. § 78l(i). For covered banks and thrifts, federal prudential banking regulators administer
Exchange Act Sections 10A(m) (audit committee requirements), 12 (registration requirements for
securities traded on national securities exchanges), 13 (periodic reporting requirements), 14(a) and 14(c)
(on proxy solicitations), 14(d) and 14(f) (on tender offers), 15C (government securities brokers and
dealers), 16 (on short swing profits), and 17A (on transfer agents). Id. §§ 78j-1(m), 78l, 78m, 78n(a), (c)–
(d), (f), 78o-5(g)(2), 78p, 78q-1(d); see also id. § 78c(a)(34)(B) (defining “appropriate regulatory
agency”). Sometimes the SEC and federal prudential banking regulators share authority. For instance,
banks and thrifts that do not qualify for the exemption for clearing activities must register with the SEC.
Id. § 78q-1(b)(1); see also id. § 78c(a)(23)(B). However, the prudential federal banking regulators
exercise rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement jurisdiction over those activities. Id. §§ 78c(a)(34)(B),
78q-1(d).
303. See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
537, 574–81 (2009).
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“security-based swaps” to the SEC.304 The two agencies jointly regulate
“mixed swaps.”305 Notably, however, the SEC and CFTC are not required to
treat functionally or economically similar swap products or entities in an
identical manner.306
This fragmented oversight of derivatives markets creates the risk of
inconsistent regulations, regulatory arbitrage, and a race-to-the-bottom, as
discussed above. While the SEC and CFTC have attempted to coordinate
with one another,307 some observers remain concerned that jurisdictional
fragmentation undermines systemic risk regulation in derivatives markets.308
In short, if FSOC were to recommend enhanced activities-based derivatives
rules, jurisdictional feuds and potentially inconsistent rules and enforcement
by the SEC and CFTC could thwart effective systemic risk regulation.
iv. Short-Term Securities Financing
Fragmented regulatory jurisdiction would likewise undercut an
activities-based approach to short-term securities financing, such as repo
agreements and securities lending. As discussed above, these short-term
liabilities pose legitimate threats to financial stability, as an institution’s
rapid loss of such funding can spread systemic risk.309 Recognizing these
risks, FSOC has warned that short-term securities financing “must be
carefully managed and subjected to appropriate oversight.”310
Comprehensive, activities-based oversight of short-term securities financing
is nearly impossible, however, because jurisdiction over repo and securities
lending is fractured among a multiplicity of regulators.
Fragmented jurisdiction over short-term securities financing stems from
its near-ubiquitous use in different financial sectors. Broker-dealers, hedge
funds, banks, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, central
304. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(b)(1)–(2). Dodd-Frank uses the word “swaps” to refer to derivatives that
were formerly traded OTC. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 59.
305. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8).
306. Id. § 8302(a)(7)(B).
307. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND
THE U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION REGARDING COORDINATION IN AREAS OF
COMMON REGULATORY INTEREST AND INFORMATION SHARING (2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/2018-07/CFTC_MOU_InformationSharing062818.pdf. Congress anticipated that this
division of authority would produce tension between the two historic rivals and enacted a host of
provisions to mediate future disputes. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a), (b)(1)–(2), (c), (d)(1), (d)(3).
308. See, e.g., Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1338–49 (2010).
309. See supra Sections I.C, III.A.1.i.
310. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2012), https://www.treas
ury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

1516

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1455

banks, sovereign wealth funds, and endowments commonly borrow through
repo or securities lending.311 Many of these same institutions also participate
on the opposite side of these transactions by providing short-term funding to
counterparties. Indeed, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds,
MMMFs, banks, governments, GSEs, securities dealers, and hedge funds are
major cash investors in both repo and securities lending.312
Given the diversity of institutions that engage in short-term securities
financing, numerous federal and state regulators assert jurisdiction over this
conduct. For example, the SEC oversees the repo activities of registered
investment companies and U.S. broker-dealers, often in tandem with the
Federal Reserve, which regulates the BHC parent companies of many
broker-dealers.313 Meanwhile, federal banking regulators oversee the repo
activities of banks, while state insurance commissioners supervise repo
transactions by insurance firms.314 Jurisdiction over securities lending is
similarly fragmented along entity and sectoral lines, with the SEC, Federal
Reserve, OCC, FDIC, U.S. Department of Labor, and state insurance
commissions all playing prominent roles.315
This decentralized oversight creates thorny problems for implementing
activities-based oversight of repo and securities lending. Just monitoring
these markets for systemic risk is difficult because the reporting
requirements differ by sector.316 Any activities-based approach to regulating
short-term securities financing—such as limits on the aggregate amount of
this activity at any firm or requirements that they be paired with liquid
assets—would inevitably result in inconsistent implementation and an
unlevel competitive playing field that would present opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, this is exactly what has occurred with respect
to entity-based approaches in this domain.317 Although an activities-based
311. See VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 740,
REFERENCE GUIDE TO U.S. REPO AND SECURITIES LENDING MARKETS 15–16, 22 (rev. ed. Dec. 2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr740.pdf; see also FSOC 2017
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 52.
312. See BAKLANOVA ET AL., supra note 311, at 17, 29.
313. See Paolo Saguato, The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A Two-Step Policy Option
to Address the Regulatory Void, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 94–95 (2017).
314. See, e.g., BAKLANOVA ET AL., supra note 311, at 34–35.
315. See id. at 31, 54–56.
316. See id. at 46–60.
317. For instance, banks engaged in repo must meet capital adequacy, liquidity, and leverage
requirements, but there are no comparable direct rules for lending agent affiliates of U.S. banks. This has
encouraged securities lending operations to migrate to overseas banks or independent nonbank firms. See
id. at 42. Moreover, cross-border differences in reporting metrics induce non-U.S. banks with low capital
ratios to temporarily reduce their repo funding soon before each quarter-end in order to appear less
levered. Benjamin Munyan, Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets 1–7, 11–12 (Office of Fin. Research,
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approach might theoretically be able to resolve this problem, there is no way
to implement such an approach consistently given the current fragmentation
of regulatory authority in this domain. Meanwhile, coordination problems
would thwart a crisis response if a securities dealer defaulted on its repo
loans because no single regulator would have the authority to oversee an
orderly sale of the collateral in its creditors’ hands, increasing the chances of
a run.318 In sum, this web of competing rules, agency fiefdoms, arbitrage
incentives, and coordination problems would make a uniform set of
activities-based rules for systemic risk nearly impossible in the repo and
securities lending space.
v. Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is yet another potentially systemic threat where
jurisdictional fragmentation would undermine an activities-based approach.
As FSOC has noted, a cyberattack or outage could disrupt market trading,
paralyze the operations of a key financial hub, interrupt clearing and
settlement, and shatter customers’ confidence in the financial system.319 This
system-wide risk demands an overarching approach that focuses on the
larger structure of financial markets and the weak links within them. U.S.
regulation of financial market cybersecurity falls woefully short of this goal.
In the financial arena, cyber regulation is siloed among various state
and federal regulators. At the federal level, nine financial regulators and the
Treasury Department have direct jurisdiction over cybersecurity at financial
firms.320 State banking, insurance, and securities regulators have concurrent
authority over state-chartered financial companies.321 Adding to this, the
Department of Homeland Security has lead responsibility for the federal
response to cyber threats, while other federal agencies and departments,
including the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of
Working Paper No. 15-22, 2015), https://www.financialresearch.gov/working-papers/files/OFRwp-2015
-22_Repo-Arbitrage.pdf.
318. See FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 12, 124; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 115 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/
Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
319. FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 127–28.
320. See Cybersecurity Regulation Harmonization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Gov’t Affairs, 115th Cong. 35 (2017) [hereinafter Feeney Testimony] (statement of Christopher F.
Feeney, President, BITS, Financial Services Roundtable); Office of Fin. Research, Cybersecurity and
Financial Stability: Risks and Resilience, OFR VIEWPOINT, Feb. 15, 2017, at 1, 7–10 [hereinafter OFR
VIEWPOINT].
321. Feeney Testimony, supra note 320; see, e.g., Key Initiative: Data, Innovation & Cyber, NAT’L
ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_risk.htm (last updated Sept.
19, 2019).
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Justice, oversee other discrete aspects of cybersecurity.322
This cybersecurity tower of Babel seriously impedes a system-wide
approach to cyber threats against financial firms. There is no single financial
regulator with sight lines into the IT infrastructure of the entire financial
sector or umbrella jurisdiction to address the sectoral threat. Alarmingly,
cooperation among federal regulators has mostly been limited to “sharing
information about cybersecurity threats.”323 The Office of Financial
Research has warned that current “[r]egulatory boundaries may limit
regulators’ perspectives on key parts of financial networks” and that
“[p]otential blind spots include third-party vendors, overseas counterparties,
and cross-border service providers.”324 To exacerbate matters, the welter of
regulators has resulted in a proliferation of cybersecurity rules, guidelines,
and frameworks that are marred by inconsistency and complexity.325
In light of system-wide risks, an activities-based approach to
cybersecurity would make eminent sense. Currently, however, the jumble of
overlapping jurisdictional lines makes a unified approach to activities-based
regulation of cybersecurity-related systemic risk impossible.
***
Jurisdictional complexities in the U.S. regulatory framework would
thus render an activities-based approach to systemic risk unworkable. Even
if FSOC were to recommend activities-based regulation for systemically
important activities, the primary financial regulators would be unlikely to
enact uniform, effective rules because of gaps and fragmentation in the
regulatory structure. Remarkably, not one of the potentially systemic
activities discussed in this section has an umbrella federal regulator that can
oversee conduct across the entire financial sector. In some cases, like
insurance activities, hedge funds, and fintech, federal regulators lack
authority to impose systemic risk constraints. In other cases, like mortgages,
derivatives, securities, short-term financing, and cybersecurity, federal
regulation is divided among multiple agencies, all with different rules and
approaches. These are just a few examples of potential weaknesses in the
U.S. regulatory framework, and additional jurisdictional problems are
certain to arise in the future. It is therefore unrealistic to imagine that
regulators could implement uniform activities-based rules to curb risk for
322. Feeney Testimony, supra note 320, at 2−3.
323. OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2016 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 47 (2016), https://www.
financialresearch.gov/financial-stability-reports/files/OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report.pdf.
324. OFR VIEWPOINT, supra note 320, at 10.
325. See Feeney Testimony, supra note 320, at 36–37.
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systemically important financial activities, absent significant reforms to the
U.S. regulatory framework.
V. AN APPROPRIATELY STRUCTURED ACTIVITIES-BASED
APPROACH COULD COMPLEMENT ENTITY-BASED
DESIGNATIONS
Abandoning FSOC’s entity-based authority in favor of an activitiesbased approach would be deeply misguided for reasons that we explained in
Parts III and IV. None of this is to say, however, that activities-based
regulation is incapable of helping to preserve financial stability. To the
contrary, activities-based regulation could combat some sources of nonbank
systemic risk—but only if Congress overhauls the U.S. regulatory
framework to achieve this goal.
In an optimal activities-based regulatory regime, a single agency with a
financial stability mandate would enact and enforce rules across the entire
U.S. financial sector. This Part explains how, if such a regime were
implemented in the United States, an activities-based approach could
meaningfully complement an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic
risk. Section V.A describes the significant structural changes that
policymakers would need to make to the U.S. regulatory framework to
operationalize an effective activities-based approach. Section V.B then
assesses the unique benefits that an activities-based approach could achieve
under this optimal regulatory design.
A. AN EFFECTIVE ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH REQUIRES A SINGLE
FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATOR
Despite its shortcomings, an activities-based approach to nonbank
systemic risk has the potential to augment an entity-based approach, but only
after significant structural reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework. The
current regime—with its fragmentation, microprudential focus, and
opportunities for arbitrage—is inimical to effective activities-based systemic
risk regulation. To effectively mitigate systemic risk through an activitiesbased approach, a financial stability regulator must have three key
characteristics: consolidated authority, a macroprudential orientation, and
market-wide reach.
First, an effective activities-based regulatory regime must be carried out
by a single federal regulator. By consolidating authority for systemic risk
regulation in one regulator, the United States could avoid the interagency
coordination problems, jurisdictional turf wars, races-to-the-bottom, and
other pitfalls inherent in its current fragmented system. Congress understood
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the need for unified jurisdiction when it consolidated nonbank SIFI
regulation in the Federal Reserve. An activities-based approach to systemic
risk likewise requires a single federal regulator.
Second, this unified regulator should have macroprudential stability as
its core objective. Financial stability oversight is principally concerned with
the transmission of systemic risk among companies and throughout the
financial sector. As discussed above, however, most U.S. sectoral regulators
currently focus on microprudential goals, such as preserving individual
firms’ solvency and protecting consumers.326 By contrast, an effective
financial stability regulator would augment this existing regime by focusing
on how systemically important activities could propagate financial
instability.
Finally, effective activities-based regulation requires the unified
systemic risk regulator to have authority over the entire financial system.
This means that the regulator must be able to implement and enforce
activities-based rules across different financial institutions, including banks,
insurance companies, investment banks, and asset managers. Market-wide
reach ensures that activities-based rules will apply consistently across the
financial system, thereby preventing risk from migrating to less heavily
regulated parts of the financial system. Moreover, it would limit uncertainty
as to whether the regulator has authority over unanticipated financial
innovations.
Other jurisdictions have adopted a regulatory structure similar to the
one we envision here.327 Often referred to as a “multi-peaked” system, this
regulatory design pairs a single financial stability regulator with one or more
additional regulators focused on other objectives, such as market conduct
and solvency oversight.328 The United States, however, has rejected previous
calls for a multi-peaked system with a consolidated systemic risk
regulator.329
To be sure, a consolidated systemic risk regulator in the United States
would face serious implementation challenges. Policymakers would have to
consider, for example, how to resolve conflicts between agencies in a multipeaked system, ensure the systemic risk regulator has access to financial
326. See supra Section III.B.4.
327. See Allen, supra note 5, at 1140–41 (describing regulatory systems in the United Kingdom and
Australia).
328. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 79.
329. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 146–56 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Docum
ents/Blueprint.pdf.
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sector information and data, and fund the agency. Moreover, such a dramatic
shift in regulatory structure would likely face political opposition from
existing regulatory agencies and entrenched financial sector interests.
We do not set out to resolve these implementation barriers here. Rather,
we highlight this alternative regulatory structure to emphasize a critical
point: for an activities-based approach to systemic risk regulation to work in
the United States, a radical restructuring of the existing regulatory
framework would be required. The Trump Administration’s proposal to shift
to a predominantly activities-based approach, unfortunately, does not
acknowledge this reality.
B. IF CONFIGURED APPROPRIATELY, ACTIVITIES-BASED REGULATION IS
UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF ADDRESSING SOME SYSTEMIC RISKS
While practically and politically challenging, these structural reforms
are nonetheless worth pursuing because a properly configured activitiesbased approach could meaningfully complement FSOC’s entity-based
designation regime. In fact, a properly designed activities-based approach
would be superior to entity-based regulation at preventing some sources of
financial stability risks. Specifically, activities-based regulation, when
structured appropriately, can address systemic correlations among firms,
mitigate risks of particular systemic activities, and help eliminate regulatory
arbitrage.
1. Activities-Based Regulation Can Address Systemic Correlations Among
Individual Firms
Properly configured activities-based regulation is well suited to
mitigate risks that cross-cut different segments of the financial sector and are
not concentrated in a single firm. Large, interconnected institutions are not
the only firms that can propagate systemic risk. Firms that are not
systemically important individually can threaten financial stability when
they adopt common business models, investment strategies, or other
correlated practices.330 Activities-based regulation can target these marketwide systemic correlations effectively and efficiently.
Potentially systemic correlations among individual firms can arise in
different ways. For example, commonalities in firms’ business models or
330. See John O’Keefe & James A. Wilcox, How Has Bank Supervision Performed and How Might
it Be Improved? 33 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.bostonfed.
org/-/media/Documents/conference/54/wilcox.pdf). The 1980s savings and loan crisis is a notable
example of numerous smaller institutions collectively transmitting systemic risk. See Lawrence J. White,
The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S65–68 (1991).
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product offerings may destabilize the broader financial system, as occurred
with nonbank mortgage lenders and securitizers during the financial crisis.331
Many of these firms were relatively small and not systemically important,
individually.332 Yet they collectively propagated systemic risk because they
adopted nearly identical business models based on issuance of dubious debt
instruments.
Similarly, correlations among nonbanks’ investment holdings and
strategies can threaten financial markets through the asset liquidation
channel.333 For example, because many insurance companies hold similar
portfolios of financial assets, the liquidation of an asset class by a subset of
insurers could create downward pressure on asset prices that threatens the
solvency of other firms.334 Simultaneous dumping of assets could occur if
firms faced similar regulatory or rating agency pressures to divest.335 Pension
funds and hedge funds may exhibit similar potentially systemic correlations
with respect to both their asset holdings and their investment strategies.336
Still other correlations could destabilize the financial system.
Widespread risk management deficiencies can create systemic risk, as when
firms’ pre-crisis risk models discounted the possibility of a nationwide drop
in housing prices.337 Similarly, defective information technology might
propagate risks, as could occur in the event of widespread cybersecurity
breaches.338 Moreover, algorithmic high-frequency traders or automated
investment advisors might adopt highly correlated strategies, creating the
risk of “flash crashes” and severe market disruptions.339 In sum, many
different types of conduct can trigger systemic risk when replicated by a
331. See supra Section I.A; Miriam Goldby & Anat Keller, Product Intervention as a
Macroprudential Tool: The Case of Catastrophe Bonds, 51 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2019)
(exploring how correlations in the design of certain financial products could potentially create systemic
risk).
332. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J.
213, 240 (2013).
333. See supra Section I.C.
334. That was the case in 2008, when a subset of insurance companies exacerbated the fire sale of
mortgage-backed securities. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1601.
335. See id. at 1596–97.
336. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 9–12
(2013), https://www.financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.
pdf.
337. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 120, 262.
338. See Why We Have to Really Worry About the Banks’ Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18,
2017, 10:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-we-have-to-really-worry-about-the-banks-cyber
security-1513652881.
339. See, e.g., William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1202 & n.170
(2018).
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critical mass of smaller institutions.
An entity-based approach is ill-equipped to address these market-wide
risks. By definition, FSOC’s entity-based designation regime applies only to
a limited subset of nonbanks that could individually threaten U.S. financial
stability through their material financial distress or mix of activities.340
Because it focuses only on these large, interconnected firms, FSOC’s entitybased approach cannot effectively mitigate systemic risk arising from
correlations among numerous smaller companies.341 For example, even if the
Federal Reserve mandated enhancements in systemically important firms’
risk models or information technology, correlated weaknesses in smaller
companies’ risk management or cybersecurity could still pose systemic risk.
By contrast, properly configured activities-based regulation is uniquely
suited to address correlated systemic risks because it can reach across
different segments of the financial sector to all institutions, regardless of their
perceived systemic importance. It was for this reason that Dodd-Frank
directly mandated several activities-based changes to financial regulation.
For example, Dodd-Frank established minimum underwriting standards and
risk-retention requirements applicable to all residential mortgage originators
and all securitizers, respectively, regardless of their systemic importance.342
Such an activities-based approach was necessary because of the plethora of
different types of firms involved in these activities.
A consolidated systemic risk regulator could implement reforms
targeting correlated, potentially systemic activities in much the same way
Congress adopted such reforms legislatively in Dodd-Frank. For instance, it
could impose regulations to mitigate weaknesses in firms’ risk management
or cybersecurity practices by establishing market-wide standards for risk
models and information technology. Or, it could implement an activitiesbased approach to correlated high-frequency or automated trading that risks
destabilizing financial markets. In this way, FSOC can use its activitiesbased authority to mitigate the chances of numerous institutions collectively
propagating systemic risk.
340. See supra Section II.A.
341. Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1627–39.
342. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o–11 (2018); Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its
Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1213–16 (2015).
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2. An Activities-Based Approach Can Target Conduct That Is
Inadequately Addressed by Entity-Based Regulation
Because it focuses on individual firms’ health, entity-based regulation
generally does not attempt to address market-wide risks posed by specific
types of financial transactions. An activities-based approach, however, can
ensure that firms conduct systemically risky activities in ways that limit
threats to financial stability.
Derivatives dealing and securities lending are classic examples of
activities that can threaten financial stability. In the lead-up to the 2008
financial crisis, just a handful of firms traded the vast majority of over-thecounter derivatives in the United States.343 This concentration created a web
of overlapping exposures among systemically important derivatives dealers,
leading to the prospect that a single dealer’s failure could impose
catastrophic losses on its counterparties.344 Similarly, AIG’s extensive
securities lending operations contributed to its collapse when borrowers
demanded early return of their cash collateral, forcing AIG to liquidate its
mortgage-backed securities portfolio and raising questions about its ability
to satisfy its obligations to counterparties.345
Standing alone, an entity-based approach is insufficient to mitigate risks
of these and other systemically risky activities. In practice, entity-based
regulation focuses inward, on broad indicators of an individual firm’s health,
such as its capital and liquidity.346 But many systemically important
activities, such as derivatives trading and securities lending, involve complex
relationships among firms across the financial sector.347 Regulating this type
of conduct often requires mediating intercompany relationships and
potentially relying on market infrastructure such as clearinghouses and
exchanges. Traditional entity-based regulation is often not well-equipped to
oversee these relationships or provide this infrastructure.348
A well-designed activities-based approach, by contrast, can more
343. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 50, 300.
344. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 1174–75.
345. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 551–55.
346. See, e.g., Enhanced Prudential Standards for Systemically Important Insurance Companies, 81
Fed. Reg. 38,610, 38,611 (June 14, 2016); Capital Requirements for Supervised Institutions Significantly
Engaged in Insurance Companies, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,631, 38,632−66 (June 14, 2016).
347. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 69, at 1165–95 (detailing the linkages across disparate
elements of the financial system).
348. Entity-based regulation could severely limit or even prohibit firms from engaging in certain
systemically risky activities. But in many cases such prohibitions would not be advisable because most
such activities have socially beneficial uses. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise
and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022–27 (2007).
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directly increase the safety of systemically important activities. That is
precisely why Congress adopted activities-based derivatives regulations in
Dodd-Frank. As a centerpiece of its derivatives reforms, Congress subjected
certain categories of swaps to mandatory central clearing and to trading on
exchanges.349 Exchange trading enhances transparency, while central
clearing places a clearinghouse between the original counterparties to a
derivative trade, thereby reducing market participants’ direct exposures to
one another.350 In this way, Congress mitigated risks through activities-based
derivatives regulation more effectively than would have been possible
through an entity-based approach alone.351
A consolidated financial stability regulator could implement activitiesbased rules to limit risks associated with other systemically important
conduct, as well. Such a regulator could, for instance, implement reforms
specifically addressing the risks of securities lending. Moreover, an
activities-based approach to repo markets could allow policymakers to
oversee both the lending and borrowing sides of those transactions. In sum,
appropriately configured activities-based regulation can help moderate the
risks of certain systemically important activities that an entity-based
approach is poorly equipped to address.
3. Activities-Based Regulation Can Help Eliminate Regulatory Arbitrage
In addition to addressing various types of systemic risk more effectively
than entity-based regulation, activities-based regulation can also improve the
effectiveness of entity-based systemic risk regulation by reducing regulatory
arbitrage. In traditional financial regulation, the applicable regulatory regime
depends on a firm’s classification as a bank, broker-dealer, insurance
company, or other type of legal entity.352 This entity-based approach
incentivizes the financial sector to shift activities to less regulated legal
entities, a fact that was well illustrated in the lead up to the financial crisis.353
AIG, for example, issued its CDSs out of AIG Financial Products, a
subsidiary that was not licensed as an insurance company and therefore
349. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1), (8) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3(a), (h) (2018).
350. See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why
Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 65–
69 (2011).
351. See generally Iñaki Aldasoro & Torsten Ehlers, The Credit Default Swap Market: What a
Difference a Decade Makes, BIS Q. REV., June 2018, at 1 (discussing the reduction in risk from
derivatives).
352. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 364–66.
353. For a seminal treatment of regulatory arbitrage, see generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
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exempt from state insurance regulation.354 Similarly, in the mid-2000s, a
significant proportion of mortgage lending shifted to federally chartered
depository institutions and their nonbank mortgage subsidiaries because
federal preemption allowed them to offer subprime and other exotic loans
free from restrictions under state anti-predatory lending laws.355
A properly designed activities-based approach would be immune to this
type of regulatory arbitrage because it would apply consistent, market-wide
standards to financial transactions, regardless of a firm’s legal
classification.356 For example, post-crisis mortgage reforms subject
residential loans to minimum underwriting standards, regardless of the
originator’s organizational form or charter.357 Market-wide activities-based
regulation thus produces three distinct benefits. First, it limits the rewards to
firms of moving activities to lesser regulated entities, and thus limits this
type of regulatory arbitrage from occurring. Second, it limits the harm that
can result when this type of arbitrage does occur. Finally, it discourages a
race-to-the-bottom by regulators that would further inflame regulatory
arbitrage.
***
In sum, when structured appropriately, an activities-based approach to
nonbank systemic risk can enhance financial stability in several unique
ways—by addressing systemic correlations, targeting systemically
important activities, and preventing regulatory arbitrage. To achieve these
benefits, however, the United States would need to dramatically reform its
regulatory framework by consolidating authority for systemic risk regulation
within a single financial stability agency. With such reforms, activities-based
regulation could meaningfully complement an effective entity-based
approach. In the absence of such reforms, however, proposals to rely
primarily or exclusively on an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic
risk are doomed to fail.
CONCLUSION
The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that, absent
appropriate regulatory oversight, nonbank financial institutions can threaten
the global economy. This Article has argued that to prevent a recurrence,
354. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1584–85.
355. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 157–66.
356. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1463–93 (2016).
357. See McCoy, supra note 342, at 1213–16.
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policymakers—both domestically and internationally—must use entity- and
activities-based approaches as complements to mitigate nonbank systemic
risk. Recent efforts to eliminate nonbank SIFI designations entirely or else
saddle them with excessive and unrealistic procedural requirements ignore
the unique ways in which entity-based regulation can prevent systemic
insolvencies. Moreover, these efforts overlook the serious practical hurdles
that activities-based regulation faces in fragmented regulatory systems such
as the United States’. An effective approach to nonbank systemic risk would
therefore retain entity-based designations while also empowering a unified
systemic risk regulator to implement activities-based rules. By using entitybased and properly configured activities-based approaches as complements,
rather than substitutes, policymakers could prevent the next AIG, Lehman
Brothers, or Bear Stearns from destabilizing the global financial system.
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